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ARTICLE 
 
The Chinese Legal Tradition as a Cultural 
Constraint on the Westernization of Chinese 
Environmental Law and Policy: 
Toward a Chinese Environmental Law and 
Policy Regime with More Chinese 
Characteristics 
PAUL A. BARRESI 
 
 More than half a century of rapid industrialization has left 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reeling from a precipitous 
decline in environmental quality.1  According to the World Bank, 
environmental pollution causes about 750,000 premature deaths 
in the PRC every year.2  About half of them are due to outdoor 
urban air pollution, with indoor air pollution causing most of the 
rest.3  Water pollution causes about 60,000 premature deaths 
 
 Professor of Political Science and Environmental Law, Southern New 
Hampshire University, Manchester, New Hampshire, U.S.A. 
(p.barresi@snhu.edu); Ph.D. (Boston University); M.A.L.D. (The Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University); J.D. with Highest Honors (The George 
Washington University National Law Center); B.S. (Cornell University). 
 1. See generally ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK:  THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S FUTURE 50-53, 59-94 (2d ed. 2010); 
JUDITH SHAPIRO, MAO'S WAR AGAINST NATURE 195 (2001). 
 2. Richard McGregor, 750,000 a Year Killed by Chinese Pollution, FIN. 
TIMES, July 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f40e248-28c7-11dc-af78-
000b5df10621.html#axzz1inmnqOP4. 
 3. See id.  The PRC's air pollution woes appeared to reach a new high in 
January 2013 when air quality monitoring equipment on the roof of the U.S. 
Embassy in Beijing recorded an air quality index of 755 on a U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) scale of 0 (for the best air quality) to 
500 (for the worst air quality), with any level above 100 meaning that the air is 
"unhealthy" and any level above 300 meaning that the air is "hazardous."  
Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing's Air Quality Tops 'Crazy Bad' at 
755, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/ 
earth/beijing-air-pollution-off-the-charts.html. Cf. AIRNOW, Air Quality Index 
(AQI) – A Guide to Air Quality and Your Health, http://airnow.gov/index.cfm? 
action=aqibasics.aqi (last visited Feb. 1, 2013) (explaining USEPA's air quality 
1
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annually, mostly in the countryside.4  According to the PRC’s 
State Council, which under the PRC’s Constitution5 functions as 
both the executive body of the national legislature–the National 
People’s Congress (NPC)–and the highest organ of state 
administration,6 environmental degradation from pollution and 
other sources costs the PRC more than $200 billion annually, 
which is ten percent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP),7 
and roughly the same as its GDP growth rate in recent years.8  
The social costs of the PRC’s environmental crisis have been just 
as dramatic.9  Grass roots environmental protests–many of them 
violent–have become increasingly common, sometimes averaging 
as much as one every other day.10  In perhaps the biggest and 
 
index).  Within two days, the municipal government had enacted a week-long 
emergency response plan that ordered nearly 100 major businesses to rein in 
their emissions by stopping or reducing production and removed nearly a third 
of government vehicles from the roads, and within a week had released a 
proposal to strengthen its air pollution regulations. Air Pollution: Beijing 
Proposes New Regulations, Penalties to Deal with Record Levels of Air Pollution, 
36 INT'L ENV'T REP. 144 (2013). 
 4. See McGregor, supra note 2. 
 5. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1982, as amended 
1988, 1993, 1999 & 2004), translated at http://english.people.com.cn/ 
constitution/constitution.html [hereinafter PRC CONST., with the date of 
enactment of provisions currently in force noted parenthetically]. 
 6. Id. art. 85 (1982). 
 7. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, General Policy: China Environmental 
Assessment Estimates $200 Billion Annual Damage from Pollution, 29 INT'L 
ENV'T REP. 438 (2006). 
 8. See THE WORLD BANK, GDP Growth (annual %), http://data.worldbank. 
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Anger in China Rises Over Threat to 
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/ 
19/international/asia/19china.html; Andrew Jacobs, In China, Pollution Worsens 
Despite New Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
07/29/world/asia/29china.html; Ian Johnson, China Faces 'Very Grave' 
Environmental Situation, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2011, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/asia/04china.html?ref=world; Joseph Kahn & Jim 
Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html; Michael 
Standaert, Toxic Substances: China to Launch Checks on Chemical Plants, 
Restrict New Companies to Industrial Parks, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 917 (2011); 
Qian Yanfeng, Protests Help Clear the Air, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 4, 2009, http:// 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/04/content_8514306.htm. 
 10. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 4, 89-91; Reuters, Pollution Fuels Protests 
and Riots, Says Environmental Boss, STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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most violent such protest to date, 30,000 to 40,000 villagers 
attacked thirteen chemical plants in Zhejiang (Che-chiang) 
Province that they blamed for a rash of crop failures, air 
pollution, and spontaneous miscarriages in the region, breaking 
windows, assaulting government officials, overturning buses, and 
setting police cars on fire.11 
This environmental crisis is similar in kind to–if not greater 
in scale than–the creeping barrage of environmental horrors that 
by the late 1960s had pummeled the West into realizing that 
something had to be done to stop and, if possible, to reverse the 
negative environmental impacts of industrialization.12  From 
killer smog events to urban rivers so burdened with industrial 
pollution that stray sparks were enough to cause them to burst 
into flame,13 this firestorm of environmental degradation finally 
galvanized Western countries into action.14  They responded with 
a flood of environmental statutes and regulations.15  Although 
new environmental challenges have emerged since most of this 
enacted law debuted in the West, especially at the global level,16 
 
thestandard.com.hk/news_print.asp?art_id=17058&sid=7588930.  According to 
one official estimate, the number of pollution "disputes" in the PRC–in whatever 
form–exceeded 50,000 in 2005 alone. Id. 
 11. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 90. 
 12. See id. at 28 ("[W]hat sets China today apart from the United States of a 
century ago . . . is the scale of the environmental degradation it confronts . . . ."). 
 13. See generally DEVRA LEE DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER 28-29 
(2002); WILLIAM WISE, KILLER SMOG: THE WORLD'S WORST AIR POLLUTION 
DISASTER 60 (1968); Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing 
a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002). 
 14. Cf., e.g., Edmund S. Muskie, A Whole Society, Address at Harvard 
University and the University of Pennsylvania (Apr. 21-22, 1970), in EARTH DAY  
– THE BEGINNING 90, 91-92 (Nat’l Staff of Envtl. Action eds., 1970) (decrying 
certain negative environmental impacts of economic growth and prosperity, and 
urging listeners to vote with an "environmental conscience"). 
 15. See, e.g., Michael E. Kraft, U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From 
the 1960s to the 1990s, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1960S-1990S 17, 
22-25, 30 (Otis L. Graham ed., 2000). Cf. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, 
MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW vii-xiv (2d ed. 1997) (observing that 
a few, mostly industrialized states adopted national environmental legislation in 
the 1960s, but that almost all states had adopted environmental legislation by 
the 1990s, mostly based on European or American models). 
 16. Cf., e.g., SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 150-53 
(rev. ed. 2008). 
3
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it has been remarkably successful in mitigating the relatively 
localized problems that most of it was intended to address.17 
Since 1979, the PRC has sought to emulate the West in that 
regard.18  The Standing Committee of the NPC19 adopted in trial 
form the PRC’s first environmental statute20–the Environmental 
Protection Law21–in 1979, then revised it substantially and 
adopted it in permanent form in 1989.22  This statute, which 
established the framework for the elaboration of the PRC’s 
 
 17. See generally Jesse H. Ausubel, David G. Victor & Iddo K. Wernik, The 
Environment Since 1970, 1 CONSEQUENCES NO. 3 (Autumn 1995) available at 
http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/fall95/envir.html (assessing 
environmental change worldwide since 1970). 
 18. Cf., e.g., A COURSE IN CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW 6-8 
(Zhang Kunmin & Jin Ruilin eds., 1992) [hereinafter ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN 
RUILIN] (arguing that the progress of environmental protection in China 
depends on environmental protection laws, and summarizing the development of 
those laws from 1979 through the early 1990s). 
 19. The NPC shares the State's legislative power with its own Standing 
Committee. E.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 58 (1982).  For the complex 
relationship between the two, see id. art. 67, §§ 1-2, 4, 6-7, 8, 11-17; id. amend. 
IV, § 10 (2004) (revising subparagraph [section] 20 of article 67), and compare 
id. art. 62, §§ 3, 5-6, 9-10, 11, 14, art. 63, §§ 2-3 (1982) (enumerating the 
functions and powers of the NPC), with id. art. 67, §§ 3, 5, 9-10, 18-19 
(enumerating the functions and powers of the NPC's Standing Committee). 
 20. By "statute," I mean legislation adopted by the National People's 
Congress or its Standing Committee and promulgated by the President. Cf. 
Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 726-27 
(1994), reprinted in CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 239 (Perry Keller ed., 2001) 
(explaining the challenge of translating the Chinese terms for various categories 
of legislation into English). 
 21. Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted 
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, promulgated by 
Order No. 22 of the President P.R.C., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), 
translated in ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org (Legislation ID number: LEX-
FAOC003551) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Envtl. Prot. Law]. 
 22. Compare id., with Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic 
of China (for Trial Implementation) (adopted in principle by the Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 13, 1979, effective Sept. 13, 1979), translated 
in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available 
at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/eplotproc564/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
PRC Envtl. Prot. Law Trial Version]; see also PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 
21, art. 47 (abrogating the trial statute).  The PRC expects to update its 
Environmental Protection Law again by 2015, partly on the basis of a pilot 
reform project slated to be undertaken in one province in central China in the 
interim.  See Michael Standaert, China: Country to Try Out Updated Version of 
Environmental Law in Shanxi Province, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 708 (2011) 
[hereinafter Standaert 07/20/11]. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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environmental law regime,23 marked the leading edge of a deluge 
of other environmental statutes, regulations, decisions, circulars, 
and other legally normative measures that resemble their 
Western counterparts in many ways.24  Like its Western analog, 
environmental law in the PRC is highly technical and scientific,25 
and almost labyrinthine in its complexity.26  The statutes at their 
core generally conform to the substantive legal taxonomy 
established in the West.  In accordance with this taxonomy, the 
PRC has enacted an environmental impact assessment statute,27 
an air pollution control statute,28 a water pollution control 
statute,29 a solid waste management statute,30 a noise pollution 
 
 23. Cf. ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the 
statute as providing the basis for "drafting specialized environmental protection 
regulations and rules"). 
 24. See, e.g., Li Kuntao & Li Wenzeng, Introduction to China's 
Environmental Protection Laws, CHINESE EDUC. & SOC'Y, May/June 2004, at 21, 
22; Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies 
and Suggested Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 161, 184-87, 190-93 (2007). Cf. 
ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 7-8 (describing enacted 
environmental law in the PRC as "an environmental statute system 
characterized with Chinese features"). 
 25. See ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
 26. See id. at 9.  Environmental law is hardly unique in this respect in the 
PRC. Cf. Keller, supra note 20, at 711 ("The disparate mass of laws and 
regulations which makes up the formal written sources of Chinese law does not 
possess sufficient unity to be regarded as a coherent body of law."). 
 27. Law of the People's Republic of China on Evaluation of Environmental 
Effects (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, 
effective Sept. 1, 2003), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/ 
cen/laws/eoeel368/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Envtl. Effects Evaluation Law]. 
 28. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., 
April 29, 2000, promulgated by the President P.R.C., April 29, 2000, effective 
Sept. 1, 2000), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ 
lotprocotpacoap841/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law]. 
 29. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Water Pollution (adopted as revised by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's 
Cong., Feb. 28, 2000, promulgated by Order No. 87 of the President P.R.C., Feb. 
28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), translated in ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org 
(Legislation ID number:  LEX-FAOC003551) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Water 
Pollution Law]. 
 30. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes (adopted as amended by the Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, promulgated by Order No. 77 of the 
5
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control statute,31 and a marine environmental protection 
statute,32 as well as an array of forestry, fisheries, wildlife, and 
other natural resource statutes with environmental 
implications.33 
Many of the policy design principles and implementation 
strategies around which these statutes revolve are Western in 
origin.  For example, some PRC environmental statutes have 
embraced versions of the polluter pays or pollution prevention 
principles, which since emerging in the West in the 1970s have 
become prominent if not necessarily pervasive features of 
Western environmental law.34  The polluter pays principle 
 
President P.R.C., Oct. 29, 1996, effective April 1, 2005), translated in ASIAN 
LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http:// 
www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocotpacoepbsw1034/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
PRC Solid Waste Law]. 
 31. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Noise Pollution (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's 
Cong., Oct. 29, 1996, promulgated by Order No. 77 of the President P.R.C., Oct. 
29, 1996, effective March 1, 1997), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS 
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/ 
legis/cen/laws/lotprocotpacoenp931/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Noise Pollution 
Law]. 
 32. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China 
(adopted as revised by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, 
promulgated by Order No. 26 of the President P.R.C., Dec. 25, 1999, effective 
April 1, 2000), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ 
meplotproc607/ (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law]. 
 33. See Canfa, supra note 24, at 187-90. 
 34. Compare, e.g., PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 3, and PRC 
Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 3, para. 1, art. 5, and PRC Envtl. Prot. 
Law, supra note 21, art. 24, art. 28, para. 1, with, e.g., Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 191, § 2, 2010 O.J. (C 
83) 47, 132, and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 
108(k), 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), (b)(4), (c)), and 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. VI, subtit. F, 104 Stat. 
1388-321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109), and Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 224(a)(2), 98 Stat. 3221, 3253 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b)(1)), and Council Directive 2008/1, Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (Codified Version), pmbl. ¶ 2, art. 1, art. 2(12), 
art. 3(1)(a)-(d), art. 6(1)(f)-(g), art. 9(3)-(4), art. 11, art. 13(1), (2)(b), art. 17(2), 
annex IV, 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8, 8, 10, 11-12, 13-14, 15, 16, 25 (EC), and Org. Econ. 
Co-operation & Dev. [OECD] Council, Recommendation of the Council on 
Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies, at ¶ I, annex ¶ a(4), OECD Doc. C(72) 128 (May 26, 
1972), available at http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx? 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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imposes the costs of pollution prevention and control on the 
polluters themselves.35  The pollution prevention principle–also 
known as “P2,” “source reduction,” or “cleaner production”–gives 
priority to reducing or to eliminating pollution at its source, with 
end-of-pipe pollution control measures serving merely as a 
fallback strategy.36  Indeed, the PRC has adopted a stand-alone 
statute to promote pollution prevention.37 
The PRC’s environmental laws also seek to implement these 
and other policy design principles by means of a host of Western 
implementation strategies.  For example, the PRC’s air and water 
pollution control statutes revolve around both ambient 
environmental quality standards and performance standards, 
which have been hallmarks of Western air and water pollution 
control laws since the 1970s.38  In general, the ambient air and 
 
InstrumentID=4&Lang=en&Book=False [hereinafter OECD Environmental 
Recommendation], and National Pollution Prevention Roundtable, Blueprint for 
Pollution Prevention & Sustainable Development: A Work in Progress, at apps. 
A-B (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-rohan.sdsu. 
edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprnts.blueprint.htm (summarizing the history of the 
pollution prevention principle as both a private sector cost control strategy and 
a public policy design principle in the United States and around the world) 
[hereinafter National P2 Roundtable Blueprint], and Nicolas de Sadeleer, The 
Polluter-Pays Principle in EU Law – Bold Case Law and Poor Harmonisation, in 
PRO NATURA. FESTSKRIFT TIL H.C. BUGGE 405, 406-08 (2012), available at http:// 
www.desadeleer.eu/uploads/papers/de%20Sadeleer.pdf (summarizing the 
recognition of the polluter pays principle in European Union law since the 
1970s). 
 35. See, e.g., OECD Environmental Recommendation, supra note 34, at annex 
¶ a(4). Cf. ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 80-84 (defining and 
explaining the derivation and significance of the "principle of 'who pollutes, who 
treats'" in the context of the PRC's Environmental Protection Law). 
 36. See National P2 Roundtable Blueprint, supra note 34, at 6, apps. A-B. Cf. 
ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 51-55 (defining and explaining 
the rationale for the "principle of laying stress on prevention" in the context of 
the PRC's Environmental Protection Law). 
 37. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Promotion of Cleaner 
Production (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2002, 
promulgated by Order No. 72 of the President P.R.C., June 29, 2002, effective 
Jan. 1, 2003), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ 
pocpl354/ (P.R.C.). 
 38. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, arts. 11-12, art. 13, 
paras. 1-2, and PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 6, art. 7, 
paras. 1-2, and PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 9, paras. 1-2, 
art. 10, with, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 
7
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water quality standards are limits on specific pollutants–usually 
applied as numerical concentrations averaged over a given period 
of time–that apply to the ambient outdoor air or to the water 
circulating in lakes, rivers, and other water bodies.39  The 
corresponding performance standards are generally limits on the 
same pollutants–usually applied numerically, but not necessarily 
as concentrations–that apply to airstreams emitted into the 
ambient air or to effluents discharged into the ambient water.40  
 
301(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 303(a)-(c), (g)-(h), 86 Stat. 816, 844-45, 846-48, 850 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 1313 (a)-(c), (g)-(h)), 
and Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 109, 111, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80, 1683-
84 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7411), and Council 
Directive 2008/50, Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe, annexes 
VII, XI, XIV, 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1, 24-25, 30-31, 34-35 (EC), and Council Directive 
2001/80, Limitation of Emissions of Certain Pollutants into the Air from Large 
Combustion Plants, annexes III-VII, 2001 O.J. (L 309) 1, 12-17 (EC), and 
Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of 
Water Policy, arts. 10(2)(b), 16(1), (7)-(8), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 18, 25 (EC) (as 
amended); see generally ZHANG KUNMIN & JIN RUILIN, supra note 18, at 14 
(listing the different types of "environmental protection standards" in the PRC).  
The PRC's Environmental Protection Law established the legal framework for 
the promulgation of both ambient environmental quality and performance 
standards. See PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 21, art. 9-10. 
 39. See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/50, Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air 
for Europe, art. 2(1)-(3), (5), (9), (14), (21), 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1, 4-5 (EC); Council 
Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water 
Policy, art. 2(31), (35), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 10-11 (EC) (as amended).  For 
example, pursuant to the administrative rule-making authority granted to it by 
the U.S. Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has 
set the "national primary 1-hour annual ambient air quality standard" for 
oxides of sulfur, measured in the ambient air as sulfur dioxide, at 75 parts per 
billion. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.17(a) (2012).  Similarly, pursuant to the authority 
granted to it by the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, USEPA has set 
the "ambient water quality criteria" for bacteria in coastal recreation waters in 
certain States at levels expressed as numbers of visible bacteria per 100 
milliliters of water. See id. §§ 131.41(a), (c)-(e).  Ambient air and water quality 
standards in the PRC follow the same general pattern. See, e.g., Environmental 
Quality Standard for Surface Water (approved by the State Envtl. Prot. Admin., 
Apr. 26, 2002, effective June 1, 2002), tbls./lists 1-3, translated at JIANGSU 
TIANYI SCI. & TECH. DEV. CO., JIANGSU WATER TREATMENT NET, available at 
http://www.jstykj.com/en/release/review.asp?id=66 (P.R.C.); CLEAN AIR 
INITIATIVE FOR ASIAN CITIES, China Releases New Ambient Air Quality 
Standards: PM2.5 Standards Set, http://cleanairinitiative.org/ portal/node/8163 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
 40. See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/80, Limitation of Emissions of Certain 
Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants, art. 2(1)-(3), 2001 O.J. (L 
309) 1, 2-3 (EC); Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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The law generally requires these performance standards to be set 
at levels sufficient to achieve the ambient standards within the 
constraints imposed by available or affordable pollution control 
technologies.41  In the water pollution realm, caps on the total 
loads of pollutants discharged into receiving waters, which are 
disaggregated and parceled out among the sources of those 
pollutants, can help to achieve ambient water quality standards 
when technology-based performance standards are a limiting 
 
in the Field of Water Policy, art. 2(40), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 11 (EC) (as 
amended).  For example, pursuant to the administrative rule-making authority 
granted to it by the U.S. Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) has prohibited the emission into the atmosphere from certain 
fossil-fuel-fired steam generators of any gases containing sulfur dioxide in 
excess of certain amounts measured in nanograms per Joule or pounds per 
million British thermal units of heat input as a "standard of performance." 40 
C.F.R. § 60.43 (2011).  Similarly, pursuant to the administrative rule-making 
authority granted to it by the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, USEPA 
has set "effluent limitations representing the degree of effluent reduction 
attainable by the application of the best available technology economically 
achievable" for certain pollutants discharged from certain steam electric power 
generating point sources at levels expressed as concentrations measured in 
micrograms per liter, as amounts equal to the flows of the discharges multiplied 
by those concentrations, or as a prohibition on any discharge or detectable 
amount, depending on the pollutant and the discretion of the permitting 
authority. 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.13(a)-(b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e), (g) (2012).  Performance 
standards for sources of air and water pollution in the PRC follow the same 
general pattern. See, e.g., Air Pollution:  New Limits on Steel Industry Pollution 
Set in China, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 869 (2012); Michael Standaert, Mining: China 
Prepares to Issue New Standards to Clean Up Rare Earths Mining Sector, 34 
INT'L ENV'T REP. 94 (2011). 
 41. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 13, paras. 1-2, 
and PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 7, paras. 1-2, and PRC 
Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 9, para. 1, art. 10, with, e.g., 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 302(a), 304(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(a), 
1314(b) (2006), and Clean Air Act §§ 107(a), 110(a)(1)-(2)(A), 172(b)-(c)(1), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1)-(2)(A), 7502(b)-(c)(1) (2006). See generally Council 
Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water 
Policy, art. 16(8), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 25 (EC) (as amended) (requiring to 
establish "environmental quality standards" for and "controls" on the principal 
sources of discharges of priority water pollutants to surface waters in certain 
circumstances based on "consideration of all technical reduction options," among 
other things); PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 21, art. 10, paras. 1-2 (requiring 
"national standards for the discharge of pollutants" to be established "in 
accordance with the national standards for environmental quality and the 
country's economic and technological conditions," and permitting certain local 
governments to establish supplementary or stricter local standards in certain 
circumstances). 
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factor, although the law makes the instrumental value of these 
caps more explicit in the West than in the PRC.42 
The list of Western-style features of the PRC’s environmental 
laws hardly ends there.  A few more examples should be sufficient 
to illustrate the point.  The PRC’s noise pollution control statute, 
for example, revolves around analogs of the ambient 
environmental quality and performance standards embedded in 
its air and water pollution control statutes, thus following the 
lead established by Western noise pollution control laws decades 
ago.43  Similarly, the PRC’s solid waste management statute 
adopts an essentially Western conception of solid waste, which is 
expansive enough to encompass solid, semi-solid, and 
containerized gaseous wastes, and which dates from the 1970s.44  
The same statute also uses an almost equally long-standing 
Western approach to identify certain solid wastes as hazardous 
wastes.  In accordance with this approach, some hazardous 
wastes qualify as such because they exhibit certain physical 
characteristics when subjected to certain scientific testing 
protocols, whereas others qualify because they appear on a list of 
solid wastes deemed to be hazardous by administrative 
authorities.45  The same statute’s complex definition of waste 
 
 42. Compare PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 18, paras. 1-3, 
with Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(d)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)-
(2) (2006). See generally Council Directive 2000/60, Framework for Community 
Action in the Field of Water Policy, art. 10(3), 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1, 19 (EC) (as 
amended) (requiring "more stringent emission controls" to be imposed when 
"emission limit values," among other pollution control measures, would be 
insufficient to achieve a given "quality standard"). Cf. PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. 
Law, supra note 32, art. 10 (requiring "the determination of water pollutant 
discharge standards . . . [to] take the control standards of the standards to 
control [sic] the total load of key pollutants for sea disposal as an important 
basis" in marine areas where total pollutant loads are being controlled). 
 43. Compare PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 10, para. 1, art. 
11, with, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972, §§ 5(a)(2), 6(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4904(a)(2), 4905(a)-(c) (2006), and Council Directive 2002/49, Assessment and 
Management of Environmental Noise, art. 5(4), art. 8, annex V, § 1, 2002 O.J. (L 
189) 12, 15-16, 23 (EC), and Council Directive 83/206, Limitation of Noise 
Emissions from Subsonic Aircraft, art. I(1), (3), (5), (7), 83 O.J. (L 117) 15, 15-16 
(EEC). 
 44. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 1, with Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006). 
 45. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 4, with 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 261.3(a)(2)(i)-(ii), 261.20(a), 261.21-.24, 261.31-.33 (2012), and Council 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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“treatment” also shows clear signs of having been influenced by 
Western law.46  Observers expect the climate change legislation 
currently being drafted in the PRC to include both a carbon tax 
and a cap-and-trade program,47 the two implementation 
strategies that continue to dominate efforts to reduce 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in the West.48 
Meanwhile, the many Western-style policy design principles 
and implementation strategies around which the PRC’s 
environmental laws largely revolve, which in the West are 
expressed with great legal precision, have been filtered through a 
purportedly modern variant of a traditional Chinese approach to 
statutory drafting that prizes both the “general” (yuanzexing) and 
the “flexible” (linghuoxing).49  The aim of this approach is to 
ensure that national laws can be implemented throughout the 
PRC but also adapted to local conditions.50  The result is a 
curious amalgam of obviously Western and characteristically 
Chinese elements that on its face ensnares both regulated parties 
and administrative officials in a labyrinth of universally 
applicable but vaguely articulated Western-style substantive and 
procedural requirements. 
 
Directive 2008/98, Waste, art. 3(2), annex III, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3, 9, 25-26 (EC), 
and Council Directive 91/689, Hazardous Waste, art. 1(4), annexes I-III, 1991 
O.J. (L 377) 20, 20-21, 23-27 (EEC), repealed by Council Directive 2008/98, 
Waste, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3 (EC). 
 46. Compare PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 88, § 6 (defining 
"treatment"), with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1004(34), 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (2006) (defining "treatment"). 
 47. See Michael Standaert, China: Draft Climate Law Expected in China; 
Change in Leadership Could Slow Other Initiatives, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. S-37 
(2012).  The Central Government already has approved pilot cap-and-trade 
programs to be launched in several provinces and municipalities. Michael 
Standaert, Emissions Trading: Carbon Trading in Seven Chinese Localities to 
Inform Choice for Nationwide System, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 74 (2012) [hereinafter 
Standaert 01/18/12]. 
 48. See, e.g., Stephen Gardner, Emissions Trading: European Commission 
Proposes to Link EU, Swiss Emissions Trading Schemes, 33 INT'L ENV'T REP. 
1126 (2010); Eduard Goldberg, Emissions Trading: New Zealand Announces 
Trading Scheme for Carbon Emissions; Abandons Carbon Tax, 30 INT'L ENV'T 
REP. 769 (2007); Jeremy Hainsworth, Taxes: British Columbia Carbon Tax Wins 
Positive Reviews for Reducing Greenhouse Emissions, 35 INT'L ENV'T REP. 646 
(2012). 
 49. See Keller, supra note 20, at 749, 749 n.191. 
 50. Id. at 749. 
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Unfortunately, this nominally Chinese but heavily law-based, 
essentially Western approach to mitigating the negative 
environmental impacts of industrialization has fallen short of its 
promise in the PRC.51  Regulated parties–usually industrial 
enterprises–routinely flout the law, often with the collusion of 
local officials.52  Institutional factors are partly to blame, at least 
with respect to enforcement.  By statute, the PRC’s 
environmental laws are enforced by local Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs), each of which is an arm of the local 
government that exists at the corresponding administrative level 
of the State.53  These local EPBs are also legally subordinate to 
 
 51. Cf. Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: 
Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 203 (2007) (arguing that the 
generally accepted view that "China's environmental laws are relatively 
complete and that enforcement is now the real problem" is only partly true 
because those laws are inherently weak in certain respects). 
 52. See, e.g., ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 5-6, 7, 75, 115; Michael Standaert, 
Enforcement: Enforcement of Environmental Laws in China Hindered by Local 
Officials' Focus on Growth, 34 INT'L ENV'T REP. 255 (2011) [hereinafter 
Standaert 03/02/11]. 
 53. Song Ying, The Chinese Environmental Lawmaking Framework, 1 
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 225, 231 (2002). Cf., e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, arts. 105, 
115 (1982) ("Local people's governments at different levels are the executive 
bodies of local organs of state power as well as the local organs of state 
administration at the corresponding level.").  The PRC is a unitary state in 
which neither the separation of powers nor federalism plays a role. See id. 
pmbl., cl. 3, arts. 30, 57 (1982); but see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG 
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 81 (2002) (arguing that as a result of economic 
reforms that have devolved both authority and responsibility to local 
governments in the PRC, "authority has become fragmented to such an extent 
that China arguably now has a de facto federalist form of government.").  In a 
pattern that even the Chinese Emperors would have recognized, however, the 
central authorities have dispersed the power of the State as a strategy for coping 
with the challenges of governing such a big country, both as a matter of policy 
and as a matter of law. See id. at 189, 241. Cf. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A 
CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 16-17 (1999) (describing in general 
the administrative subdivision of the Chinese empire down to the county level, 
and the tendency of the Chinese Emperors to rule indirectly through local elites, 
thus stretching the state resources available to govern such a large country).  
The PRC Constitution divides the State into a complex network of eleven 
different types of nested administrative units. See PRC CONST., supra note 5, 
art. 30 (1982). Cf. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The World Factbook, East 
and Southeast Asia: China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ ch.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2013) (listing the numbers, 
Chinese-language designations, and proper names of certain administrative 
subdivisions of the PRC).  All of these administrative subdivisions qualify as 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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the Central Government’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
but depend on the local governments of which they are a part for 
most of their funding, among other resources, and therefore tend 
to be more responsive to them than to their nominal superiors in 
Beijing.54  At the same time, powerful political incentives have 
encouraged local governments to pursue economic development at 
almost any cost,55 regardless of what environmental laws 
require.56 
Beyond this institutional problem, however, lies a more basic 
cultural one, with profound implications for both enforcement and 
compliance.  It is here that the Chinese legal tradition plays a 
pivotal role.  In this context, the term legal tradition refers to “a 
set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the 
nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, 
about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, 
and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, 
perfected, and taught.”57  A society’s legal tradition doubles as the 
core of its legal culture.58  A society’s legal system is the set of 
 
"local" under PRC law. Cf., e.g., Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses 
and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China (adopted by 
the Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 1 of the 
Chairman Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 4, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 
1980, as amended for the fourth time by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's 
Cong., Oct. 27, 2004), art. 18, paras. 1-2, translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., 
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/ 
cn/legis/cen/laws/olotlpcalpgotproc908/ (P.R.C.) (referring to various levels of 
"local" government in prescribing procedures for submitting bills and proposals 
to local people's congresses). 
 54. See ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 113. 
 55. Cf. Canfa, supra note 24, at 171 (noting that GDP has been "the primary 
standard against which the achievements of local governments are measured" 
since 1992). 
 56. See, e.g., Lixin Gu & William R. Sheate, Institutional Challenges for EIA 
Implementation in China: A Case Study of Development Versus Environmental 
Protection, 36 ENVTL. ASSESSMENT 125 (2005); Standaert 03/02/11, supra note 
52. 
 57. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 2 (3d ed. 2007). 
 58. See id. ("The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of 
which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural 
perspective.").  By culture, I mean the set of descriptive and prescriptive beliefs 
and associated behaviors that together define a distinct way of life for the 
members of a given social group in a given domain of experience, and are 
transmitted socially between generations.  This definition falls squarely within 
13
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institutions through which the society’s legal tradition and the 
broader legal culture of which it is a part are expressed.59 
The most widespread and influential legal traditions 
worldwide are the civil law tradition and the common law 
tradition.60  The former is rooted historically in the law of the 
ancient Roman republic, and dominates in Europe, Latin 
America, and much of Asia and Africa.61  The latter dates from 
the Norman conquest of England, and is found in Great Britain 
and its former colonies.62  The Chinese legal tradition predates 
the Roman civil law by as many as several centuries, and has 
been as influential throughout East Asia as the civil law and 
common law traditions have been in other parts of the world.63  
Although this legal tradition is uniquely Chinese, it resembles its 
civil law counterpart in crucial respects.64  As is almost always 
the case in civil law jurisdictions, enacted law is and always has 
been the only formal source of law in China.65  Moreover, much 
like the courts in civil law jurisdictions, Chinese courts almost 
never have had the authority to interpret this enacted law, and 
never have had the authority to render decisions with 
precedential effect, although judicial decisions have served as 
informal guidance for courts in other cases since China’s imperial 
 
the scope of the ordinary usage of the term. See John Gerring & Paul A. Barresi, 
Culture: Joining Minimal Definitions and Ideal-Types, in CONCEPTS AND 
METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE TRADITION OF GIOVANNI SARTORI 241 (David 
Collier & John Gerring eds., 2009). 
 59. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 2 ("A legal tradition . 
. . is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about . . . the 
proper organization and operation of a legal system, [among other things] . . . .  
The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial 
expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective."). 
 60. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 98-118, 218-37 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998). 
 61. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 2-3. 
 62. Id. at 3-4. 
 63. See JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA 3-4 
(2005). 
 64. Cf. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that many 
Chinese jurists think of China as a civil law jurisdiction, but emphasizing that 
comparative lawyers recognize a distinct East Asian legal tradition). 
 65. Compare id. at 24-25 (listing the sources of law in the civil law tradition), 
with HEAD & WANG, supra note 63 (surveying the legal codes of the Chinese 
empire), and LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 145 ("According to Chinese law and 
doctrine, the sole source of legal rules is legislation . . . .” ). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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era.66  Yet despite these superficial similarities, the Chinese and 
civil law traditions have been shaped by fundamentally different 
historical and cultural factors.  Whereas the modern civil law 
tradition is primarily an expression of the ideology of the French 
Revolution and nineteenth-century German legal science,67 the 
Chinese legal tradition has been shaped primarily by indigenous 
historical and cultural phenomena.68 
This Article argues that the Chinese legal tradition is 
essentially a Confucian legal tradition, and that its Confucian 
attributes significantly constrain the effectiveness of the 
Western-style environmental laws enacted by the PRC in recent 
decades.  Part I explores the emergence of a Confucian legal 
tradition in China and its impact on Chinese legal culture before 
the founding of the PRC.  Part II highlights some of the impacts 
of this tradition on the Chinese legal system during the same 
period.  Part III makes a case for the endurance of the Confucian 
essence of this legal tradition in the PRC itself, and highlights its 
implications for the effectiveness of the PRC’s Western-style 
environmental laws.  This Article concludes with a few 
preliminary strategic suggestions for making the PRC’s 
environmental law and policy regime more effective by aligning it 
more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal 
tradition. 
 
 66. Compare MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 23-25, 46-47 
(describing the implications of the civil law tradition's conception of the sources 
of law for the limited scope of the judicial function), with LUBMAN, supra note 53, 
at 23, 281-85 (describing the historic and contemporary role of cases in Chinese 
law); but cf. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 42-46, 47 
(describing the tension between theory and practice with respect to the judicial 
function in civil law jurisdictions). 
 67. See, e.g., MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 15-19, 61-67. 
 68. Cf. id. at 4 (noting that some observers have suggested the existence of a 
Confucian legal tradition in East Asia). 
15
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I.   THE EMERGENCE OF A CONFUCIAN LEGAL 
TRADITION IN CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON 
CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE BEFORE THE 
FOUNDING OF THE PRC 
The emergence of a Confucian legal tradition in China is 
integrally bound up with the origin and early history of China 
itself.  Law per se–or fa69–almost never has played more than a 
subordinate role in maintaining social and political order in 
China.70  It played a dominant role only during the Qin (Ch’in) 
Dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.),71 after Ying Zheng (Ying Cheng)–the 
ruler of the Chinese kingdom of Qin–finally unified the country 
after nearly 200 years of warfare among several Chinese states.72  
The Qin’s fa-based approach to governance–known as the 
Legalist or School of Law (fa jia) tradition–was not a new 
invention, having emerged almost 200 years earlier in the 
Chinese Kingdom of Zhou (Chou).73  The Qin’s embrace of this 
strategy was deeply unpopular, however, and did not last for 
long.74  After only fifteen years, the Qin were overthrown by the 
founder of what became the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.).75  
 
 69. Fa means the positive or written law in the abstract, although it also can 
be used to refer to individual laws. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN 
IMPERIAL CHINA 11 (1967).  The term connotes a standard of behavior to which 
ordinary people must conform because it has been imposed on them by superior 
authority. See id. 
 70. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 48 (noting the low esteem in which the 
Chinese always have held law as a means of achieving social order). 
 71. With rare exceptions, which are described infra, this article romanizes 
Chinese names and other Chinese nouns according to the pinyin system, 
followed parenthetically in the first instance by the Wade-Giles equivalent, if 
different.  Some Chinese names have become so familiar to Western audiences 
either in their Wade-Giles form (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek), as Latinized equivalents 
of the Chinese (i.e., Confucius, Mencius), or in some other romanized form (i.e., 
Sun Yat-sen) that this article uses the more familiar forms, followed 
parenthetically in the first instance either by the pinyin or by both the pinyin 
and the Wade-Giles romanizations, in that order, as appropriate.  The diacritical 
marks indicating the tones that would distinguish among what otherwise would 
be homonyms in spoken Chinese have been omitted from all romanizations. 
 72. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 63-75. 
 73. See id. at 45-48. 
 74. See id. at 73, 75. 
 75. See id. at 76-77.  Strictly speaking, the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 
C.E.) was comprised of two distinct dynasties -- the Former Han (206 B.C.E.-8 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/6
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For most of the 2,200 years since then, Confucian behavioral 
norms–or li76–have been much more important than fa as a 
means of maintaining social and political order in China.77  These 
li encompass the full range of institutions and relationships that 
Confucianists believe are necessary to maintain social and 
political harmony.78 
A pre-Confucian form of the li performed this function among 
the members of the Zhou aristocracy in the middle of the second 
millennium B.C.E.79  Confucius (Kung Fuzi or K’ung-fu-tzu) (551-
479 B.C.E.) built upon the Zhou li by expanding the li concept to 
encompass relations among all members of society, by 
emphasizing that government should be based almost solely on 
the li instead of on fa, and by arguing that the authority to 
govern therefore ought to be vested in scholars who had 
demonstrated their mastery of the li.80  The most influential of 
Confucius’s early disciples–Mencius (Mengzi or Meng-tzu) (372-
289 B.C.E. or 390-305 B.C.E.) and Xunzi (Hsun-tzu) (313-238 
B.C.E.)81–modified Confucius’s own philosophy in the centuries 
between his death and China’s unification by positing that the 
function of the li was to maintain the inherent stratification of 
society, and that punishment should play a greater role in 
 
C.E.) and the Later Han (25-220 C.E.) -- separated by a brief interregnum that 
scholars generally discount as historically insignificant. See id. at 77-82. 
 76. Strictly speaking, li means "rites" or "ritual." D. C. Lau, Introduction to 
CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS ix, xxxviii (D. C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1992). 
 77. See, e.g., EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EAST ASIA: THE 
GREAT TRADITION 30 (1960). 
 78. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 19. 
 79. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 23-24, 28-30. 
 80. Id. at 32.  For the classic statement of Confucius's own teachings, see 
CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (D. C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press 2d ed. 1992). 
 81. For more than 1,000 years, Mencius's contribution to the Confucian 
tradition has been recognized officially in China as second in importance only to 
that of Confucius himself. D. C. Lau, Introduction to MENCIUS, MENCIUS ix, ix 
(D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter Lau on 
Mencius].  Strictly speaking, Mencius's name was Mengke (Meng K'o), and 
Mencius merely the title of his book, see MENCIUS, MENCIUS (D.C. Lau trans., 
Chinese Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003), but the one has come to be known by the 
title of the other. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 41 n.46.  Xunzi, who is the 
only other great figure in early Confucianism, had much less influence on later 
scholars. Lau on Mencius, supra note 81, at ix-x. 
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governance than Confucius himself preferred as a supplement to 
leadership by moral example based on the li.82 
The most enduring form of Confucianism emerged about a 
century later during the reign of Emperor Wudi (Wuti) (141-87 
B.C.E.), who presided over the golden age of the Former Han 
Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-8 C.E.).83  Emperor Wudi had been educated 
in the Confucian classics, the oldest of which were already many 
centuries old,84 so it was natural that he should turn to a 
Confucian scholar–Dong Zhongshu (Tung Chung-shu) (ca. 179-
104 B.C.E.)–to articulate a clear rationale for the Emperor’s claim 
to be the legitimate, sole ruler over all of China.85  Dong rose to 
the challenge by reinventing Confucianism as an imperialist 
amalgam that blended the preexisting form with elements of the 
Legalist tradition, Daoism, and other cosmologies.86  This 
“imperial Confucianism”87 would play an indispensable role in 
reinforcing the imperial system for the next 2,000 years.88 
The li of imperial Confucianism were derived from the basic 
Confucian conception of a naturally harmonious cosmic order 
inhabited by human beings who are naturally rational, whether 
or not they are naturally good,89 and who therefore are capable of 
 
 82. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 41-45; see also MENCIUS, supra note 81, 
at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 1 (quoting Mencius as affirming, "Goodness alone is not 
sufficient for government; The law unaided cannot make itself effective."). Cf. id. 
(quoting Mencius as saying, "When those above have no principles and those 
below have no laws, . . . then it is good fortune indeed if a state survives."). 
 83. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 32, 78-79, 86-87.  For the 
relationship between the Former and Later Han dynasties, see supra note 75. 
 84. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 87.  For brief histories and 
summaries of the Confucian classics and their relationship to Confucianism per 
se, see REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 64-67, 68. 
 85. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-87. Cf. BRADLEY SMITH & WAN-GO 
WENG, CHINA: A HISTORY IN ART 79 (1973) (describing the mutually beneficial 
"meeting of the minds" of Emperor Wudi and Dong Zhongshu). 
 86. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-91; see also REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, 
supra note 77, at 105-07 (explaining the "philosophical syncretism" of Han-era 
Confucianism, and noting Dong Zhongshu's rise to prominence in Wudi's court). 
 87. See, e.g., HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-91. 
 88. Cf., e.g., REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 107-08 (attributing 
the superior longevity of the Chinese empire partly to the incorporation of 
imperial Confucianism into the Chinese State). 
 89. See, e.g., HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 49 box II-1, 88-89.  Mencius 
and Xunzi disagreed about whether human beings are naturally good, although 
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1174 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
learning the virtuous behaviors needed to maintain social 
stability and, thus, to preserve cosmic harmony.90  These li vary 
in accordance with a person’s age and social rank, primarily in 
the context of the five principal Confucian social relationships–
ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother 
and younger brother, and friend and friend91–of which the first 
three are the most important.92  In general, rulers should be 
benevolent whereas subjects should be loyal; fathers should be 
compassionate whereas sons should be filial; elder brothers 
should be kind whereas younger brothers should be respectful; 
husbands should be righteous whereas wives should be 
submissive; and friends should be faithful.93  The li derive their 
legitimacy from their role in reinforcing the harmonious cosmic 
order of which the stratification of society is an expression.94  
Society both ensures its own stability and preserves cosmic 
harmony by socializing its members to behave in accordance with 
the li.95  The Emperor’s own behavior plays an indispensable role 
in this dynamic.96  As the ultimate behavioral exemplar, the 
 
later Confucian scholars sided with Mencius in believing that they are. See, e.g., 
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 80-81. 
 90. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 35-36, 41-44, 49 box II-1, 88-89. Cf. 
MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. VI, pt. A, ¶ 6 (quoting Mencius as affirming the 
inherent capacity of human beings to become good). 
 91. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20, 21. 
 92. Cf. SMITH & WENG, supra note 85, at 79 (noting Dong Zhongshu's view 
that social stability depends on the relationships between ruler and subject, 
father and son, and husband and wife). 
 93. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 49 box II-1; see also MENCIUS, supra note 
81, at bk. I, pt. A, ¶ 5, bk. III, pt. A, ¶ 4, bk. III, pt. B, ¶ 2, bk. VI, pt. B, ¶ 7 
(quoting Mencius on proper behavior, duties, and the nature of certain social 
relationships). 
 94. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20-21. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 
80, at bk. I, ¶ 12 (quoting one of Confucius's disciples with approval as saying, 
"Of the things brought about by the rites [li], harmony is the most valuable.").  
Only the Confucian relationship of friend to friend implies a measure of social 
equality. See DANIEL C. K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 43 (2003). Cf. MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. III, pt. A, 
¶ 4 (quoting Mencius as characterizing the relationship between friends as 
based on "faith"). 
 95. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20, 21. Cf. MENCIUS, supra note 
81, at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 1, bk. VII, pt. B, ¶ 32 (quoting Mencius on the relevance of 
the li to the preservation of the State and the order of the Empire). 
 96. Cf. JEROME CH'ÊN, YUAN SHIH-K'AI 200 (1961) ("[O]nly the Emperor, the 
son of Heaven, might intercede with Heaven for his people."). 
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Emperor is the linchpin of social stability,97 and thus of cosmic 
harmony.  An Emperor who fails to fulfill this role by failing to 
observe the li forfeits the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) from 
which his authority is derived, and thus forfeits the right to 
rule.98 
Imperial Confucianism–either with or without its explicitly 
imperial trappings, which are not especially relevant here–
implies a distinctly Confucian legal tradition with distinctly 
Confucian conceptions of the nature of law and its role in society 
and the polity.  With respect to the nature of law, this Confucian 
legal tradition makes a basic moral distinction between the li and 
fa.  The li are of universal moral validity because they were 
derived from human nature and the cosmic order by the ancient 
savants.99  Fa has no moral validity because it is merely a 
modern human construct intended to serve as an ad hoc source of 
political power.100  This basic moral distinction has important 
implications for the role of law in society and the polity.  A 
government based on the persuasive power of the li is virtuous, 
whereas a government based on the compulsive power of fa is 
merely tyrannical.101  A government based on the li is also 
harmonious because the li are unwritten and therefore can be 
adapted to fit any circumstance,102 and because a ruler who 
governs through the li is capable of winning the loyalty of his 
subjects by force of moral example.103  A government based on fa 
 
 97. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 31-32; see also MENCIUS, supra note 
81, at bk. IV, pt. A, ¶ 20 (quoting Mencius as saying, "When the prince is 
benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the prince is dutiful, everyone else 
is dutiful; when the prince is correct, everyone else is correct. Simply by 
rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm basis."). Cf. CONFUCIUS, 
supra note 80, at bk. XVI, ¶ 2 (quoting Confucius as saying, "When the Way 
prevails in the Empire, the rites . . . are initiated by the Emperor."). 
 98. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 18 box I-3, 28-29. Cf. MENCIUS, 
supra note 81, at bk. V, pt. A, ¶ 5 (quoting Mencius as explaining how only 
Heaven can give the Empire to the Emperor). 
 99. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 20-21. 
 100. Id. at 21. 
 101. See id. at 20. 
 102. See id. at 21. 
 103. See id. at 20. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. XII, ¶ 17 (quoting 
Confucius as saying, "Government (cheng) is being correct (cheng). If you give a 
lead in being correct, who would dare to be incorrect?") (footnote omitted); 
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lacks harmony, however, and merely sows contention in 
society.104  Although fa is sufficiently coercive to ensure that the 
people comply with its formal requirements, it is incapable of 
ensuring that they abide by its spirit because it fosters no inner 
loyalty to the State.105 
This Confucian legal tradition leaves little room for law as a 
means of maintaining social or political order, except as a fallback 
strategy to be used in isolated instances to restore social–and 
therefore, cosmic–harmony by punishing the few social deviants 
who fail to conform to the li.106  Hence the traditional Chinese 
proverb that law is meant for the base person, but not for the 
gentleman.107  Moreover, the resort to law by either individuals 
or the State is by definition a departure from the social and 
cosmic harmony that the law’s enforcement seeks to restore.108  
The resort to law is also an admission of moral failure–on the 
part of individuals, society, and the State, unlike in Western legal 
traditions.109  In accordance with these features of the Confucian 
 
MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. II, pt. A, ¶  3, bk. III, pt. A, ¶ 3 (quoting Mencius 
on how a true king teaches the people to be affectionate). 
 104. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 21. 
 105. See id. at 20, 21. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. II, ¶ 3 (quoting 
Confucius as saying, "Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with 
punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no 
sense of shame."); MENCIUS, supra note 81, at bk. II, pt. A, ¶ 3 (quoting Mencius 
as saying, "When people submit to force they do so not willingly but because 
they are not strong enough. When people submit to the transforming influence 
of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their hearts."). 
 106. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 3, 4; Franz Michael, The Role of Law 
in Traditional, Nationalist and Communist China, CHINA Q., Jan.-Mar. 1962, at 
124, 128. See generally BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 43-48, 50 (exploring 
and summarizing the traditional Chinese view of law as a means of repairing 
violations of the social order and, thus, of cosmic harmony, and offering 
illustrations from various imperial legal codes). 
 107. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic 
of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 29, 32 (1989) (attributing the proverb to the traditional 
Chinese belief that the only purpose of law is "to deter the potentially evil"). 
 108. Cf. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 43 (arguing that the traditional 
Chinese view of law "primarily as an instrument for redressing violations of the 
social order . . . could hardly have started with the Confucians, at least the early 
Confucians, since law to them was itself a violation of the social order."). 
 109. See Michael, supra note 106, at 124-26, 128. Cf. REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, 
supra note 77, at 84 ("Whereas Western law has been conceived of as a human 
embodiment of some higher order of God or nature, the law of the Legalists [in 
imperial China] represented only the ruler's fiat."). 
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legal tradition, most of the Emperor’s subjects viewed the 
imperial fa as both morally vacuous and inherently unpleasant, 
and of little relevance to their daily lives.110  Their antipathy 
toward the law was matched only by their aversion to the local 
magistrate’s office (yamen), which functioned as the local imperial 
court.111  The dead should stay out of hell, went an imperial 
Chinese saying, and the living should stay out of yamens.112 
The Empire endured for more than 2,100 years, from the 
unification of China by the Qin in 221 B.C.E. until the abdication 
of the last Emperor of the Qing (Ch’ing) Dynasty (1644-1912) in 
February 1912.113  It was succeeded for a few decades by a 
nominal republic,114 in which similarly Confucian attitudes 
toward law prevailed.115  The Chinese of the early Republican era 
 
 110. See REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 84. Cf. BODDE & MORRIS, 
supra note 69, at 3-4, 5-6 (explaining how "Chinese traditional society . . . was 
by no means a legally oriented society" in that the behavior of ordinary Chinese 
people was constrained much more by Confucian ethical principles than by law); 
JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: THE 
MODERN TRANSFORMATION 624 (1965) ("[L]aw had been neither primary nor 
pervasive in [imperial] Chinese society."); PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 39 
(explaining why many people in imperial China considered participating in a 
lawsuit to be disgraceful, and preferred to use informal means of dispute 
resolution instead). 
 111. See LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 23. Cf. ARTHUR H. SMITH, CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 238 (13th ed. 1894) (noting the tendency of the literati to be 
terrified in the presence of a district magistrate, even in cases that do not 
concern them personally).  Local magistrates, who performed the imperial 
analog of what Westerners would consider to be a judicial function, among many 
other functions, were the all-purpose administrative representatives of the 
Emperor at the local level. William C. Jones, Introduction to THE GREAT QING 
CODE 1, 9-10 (William C. Jones trans., 1994). 
 112. SMITH, supra note 111, at 214. 
 113. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 640-41; 
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 85-92. Cf. PERCY HORACE KENT, THE 
PASSING OF THE MANCHUS 310-16 (photo. reprint 1977) (1912) (recounting the 
abdication of the last Qing Emperor). 
 114. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 642-717, 
848-60. 
 115. Cf. PAUL S. REINSCH, AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT IN CHINA 117, 177, 291-92 
(1922) (remarking on the limited role of written laws and "set tribunals" in 
Chinese life, and quoting a prominent Chinese official as explaining that 
abstract legal thinking and "hard-and-fast" Western ideas of legality in relations 
between the central government and regional governments are foreign to the 
Chinese way of thinking). 
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were “[n]ot much given to legal refinements,”116 as one 
knowledgeable Westerner observed, and resented the careful 
draftsmanship of the American contract lawyers employed by the 
American engineers and financiers who flocked to China to profit 
from its government’s efforts to modernize the country’s 
infrastructure.117  Steeped for millennia in a Confucian legal 
tradition, the Americans’ Chinese partners had become 
accustomed to doing business without the benefit of written 
contracts.118  By the twilight of the Republic, this antipathy 
toward the law remained unchanged.119  As late as the 1940s, 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the last supreme leader of the 
Republic on the mainland,120 felt compelled to exhort his 
compatriots that they must “habituate [them]selves to rule by 
law” so that they could “accomplish the task of establishing 
[their] state on the basis of law.”121  Meanwhile, Chiang himself 
was invoking the wisdom of the ancient Confucian sages for the 
proposition that morality ought to be ontologically prior to law in 
the maintenance of the Chinese polity.122 
 
 116. Id. at 208. 
 117. See id. at 208-09. 
 118. Cf. SUN YAT-SEN, SAN MIN CHU I: THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE 
WITH TWO SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK 40 (Frank W. Price 
trans., Comm'n for the Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang ed., n.d.) 
(explaining that no contract is needed when a foreigner places an order for goods 
in China because the Chinese use "verbal [sic] promises" rather than written 
contracts in their business relations). 
 119. Cf. PAN WEI-TUNG, THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF FORTY YEARS 
OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN CHINA 133 (1945) (observing during the late Chinese 
Republic that China has been governed for 2,300 years more by Confucian 
morality than by "formal law"). 
 120. See generally JONATHON FENBY, CHIANG KAI-SHEK: CHINA'S 
GENERALISSIMO AND THE NATION HE LOST (2004).  Chiang and his government 
were driven from the mainland by the Communists in 1949 after a protracted 
civil war. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 859-60. 
 121. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA'S DESTINY 211 (Wang Chung-hui trans., 1947). 
 122. See id. at 203. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 184 (describing Chiang as 
caught between his desire to modernize China and his insistence on the primacy 
of Confucian principles and behavioral norms). 
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II.   IMPACTS OF THE CONFUCIAN LEGAL 
TRADITION ON THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM 
BEFORE THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC 
The attitudes about the nature of law and its role in society 
and the polity at the center of the Confucian legal tradition imply 
certain attitudes about the proper organization and operation of a 
legal system.  China’s legal system reflected these attitudes for 
millennia before the founding of the PRC.123  For example, there 
was much less law in imperial China than there was in the West 
during the same period.124  Moreover, what law there was in 
China was overwhelmingly punitive.125  For example, it was 
typical for the complainant, the accused, and all witnesses to be 
imprisoned under horrific conditions for the duration of any legal 
proceeding in which they were involved.126  The interrogation of 
witnesses or other law-abiding persons in connection with legal 
proceedings often involved torture.127  Even the least severe legal 
 
 123. Cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 228-29 (characterizing the history of 
legal codification in imperial China through the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 
1912 as "a form of legal conservatism – a conserving of . . . the Legalist-
Confucianist alloy[] that had emerged from the Qin-Han period.”). 
 124. Cf. LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 19-20 (noting the dearth of commercial law 
in the Chinese imperial law codes, and the extent to which the terms of 
commercial transactions were governed by custom); PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 
119, at 133 (arguing that China has been governed for ages less by "formal law" 
than by "a sense of morality and reason"). 
 125. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 219-20. Cf. KENT, supra note 113, at 
69 (describing how the authorities in imperial China have a great advantage 
over troublemakers in "a country where there are no niceties of judicial process 
and vengeance is swift and sure.").  For insights into the ancient Chinese 
association of law (fa) with punishment (xing), especially corporal punishment, 
both conceptually and as a matter of legal usage, see BODDE & MORRIS, supra 
note 69, at 11-12. 
 126. Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE art. 396, § 1, art. 
407 (William C. Jones trans., 1994) (addressing the imprisonment of law-abiding 
persons interrogated about public matters under investigation with which they 
are involved indirectly, and the unduly prolonged imprisonment of 
complainants). 
 127. See Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 
126, art. 396, § 2 (referring to "putting [witnesses] to the question" and in 
certain circumstances "interrogation under torture . . . carried out according to 
the law" with respect to law-abiding persons indirectly involved with public 
matters under investigation). See generally SMITH, supra note 111, at 214 
(describing some of the "dreadful tortures which are inflicted upon Chinese 
prisoners in the name of justice."). 
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punishment meted out by the magistrate–a beating with a light 
bamboo rod–could be crippling, if not deadly.128  In a society that 
considered Confucian behavioral norms to be the morally 
preferable means of maintaining social and political order, and in 
which law functioned merely as a fallback strategy for restoring 
social and cosmic harmony by punishing the few social deviants 
who failed to conform to the li, the punitive character of the 
imperial fa ought not to be surprising.129  Its principal purpose 
was to enable the magistrate to identify the proper punishment 
for any legally significant transgression against the Emperor or 
the social order for which he was responsible, which was the only 
type of behavior to which the fa applied.130  The punitive 
character of the imperial fa was primarily what led the Western 
powers to insist on the principal of extraterritoriality for their 
own nationals in the unequal treaties that they forced upon the 
Chinese beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century.131  As 
late as the 1940s, Westerners in China still were subject to 
Western law rather than Chinese law, as was their real and 
personal property.132 
The laws with which the Western powers were concerned 
comprised only a small part of the imperial fa, however.  In 
accordance with the Confucian conception of law as merely a 
 
 128. See Jones, supra note 111, at 11. Cf. THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 
126, art. 1 (defining the five basic punishments applicable in various degrees to 
the universe of legal transgressions). 
 129. Cf. supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (explaining the moral 
distinction between the li and fa and the implications of that distinction for the 
roles of the li and fa in society and the polity in the Confucian legal tradition). 
 130. See Jones, supra note 111, at 12-13, 24. 
 131. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 144-46, but cf. 
BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 41-43 (noting various respects in which the 
imperial fa was more humane that its Western analog, both on its face and as 
applied). 
 132. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 714.  The legal 
modernization efforts undertaken by the central government of the nominal 
republic that followed the Empire's collapse were in part a response to the 
refusal of the Western Powers to abandon the principle of extraterritoriality 
unless China reformed its criminal laws. See VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT 
LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 20 
(1978). 
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source of political power,133 most of the imperial fa focused on 
ensuring that the Emperor’s bureaucrats performed their duties 
properly, and on punishing them when they did not.134  Very little 
fa applied to relations among private individuals, and then only 
insofar as those relations impinged upon the interests of the 
Emperor.135  Even this fa applied to private matters only through 
the agency of the State, such that a private party with what in 
the West would be viewed as a civil claim against another private 
party would complain to the Emperor’s bureaucrats, who would 
decide whether or not to take legal action against the alleged 
wrongdoer.136  No fa at all applied to the Emperor himself, whose 
authority to rule was a function of his position at the apex of the 
Confucian social hierarchy believed to be an expression of the 
natural cosmic order, and who therefore was beyond the reach of 
purely human institutions such as law.137 
 
 133. Cf. supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (contrasting the moral 
validity and related implications of the li and fa in the Confucian legal 
tradition). 
 134. See Jones, supra note 111, at 6-7, 9, 11. Cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, 
at 222 (emphasizing that the "audience" of the dynastic legal codes was the 
imperial bureaucracy). 
 135. Jones, supra note 111, at 6; see BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 4 
(explaining how imperial Chinese law was concerned primarily with acts that 
seemed disruptive of the social order, and only secondarily with defending the 
rights of citizens against each other). But cf. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 
222-25 (arguing that if the Qing Code is viewed as being aimed primarily at 
regulating the behavior of state bureaucrats, then it nevertheless addresses in 
that context many of the same issues that in the West are private civil law 
matters). 
 136. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 4. 
 137. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 41; see also LUBMAN, supra note 53, at 15-
17 (referring to the seemingly absolute power of the Emperor within the 
authoritarian hierarchy of Chinese society in theory, but noting that the 
Emperor's power also was limited in theory by his duty to implement the cosmic 
order in accordance with the classic Confucian texts). But cf. WEN CHING, THE 
CHINESE CRISIS FROM WITHIN 110-11 (G. M. Reith ed., 1901) (explaining how the 
Emperor's power was absolute in theory but strictly circumscribed in practice 
because the heir apparent was trained to respect the existing governmental 
machinery and not to innovate).  The Emperor would have remained almost 
wholly above the law even under a plan for a constitutional monarchy endorsed 
by imperial edict in the final years of the Empire. See KENT, supra note 113, at 
39-40. 
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Moreover, the imperial fa was pervaded by Confucian ethical 
principles.138  The process of incorporating the latter into the 
former began during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.), and 
was complete by the time that the Tang (T’ang) Dynasty (618-907 
C.E.) enacted its legal code in 653 C.E.139  The law remained 
substantively Confucian through the collapse of the last imperial 
dynasty in 1912,140 most notably in its treatment of different 
persons differently–whether they were defendants, would-be 
defendants, or convicted persons–depending on their status 
within the Confucian social hierarchy, both in the abstract and 
relative to any injured parties.141  It also codified certain 
especially important Confucian social obligations, such as filial 
piety.142  Moreover, the Confucian context in which the imperial 
fa was enacted and applied lent its content a coherence that its 
structure often lacked.143  Even Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung’s) 
father once lost a lawsuit in the twilight of the imperial era 
because his opponent offered the court a fitting quotation from 
the Confucian classics.144 
The efforts of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (Kuomintang)–
or National People’s Party145–to Westernize the legal system of 
the nominal Republic that briefly succeeded the Empire marked 
 
 138. HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 235; PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 38. 
But cf. Jones, supra note 111, at 16-18 (acknowledging that "[t]here seems to be 
no question that Confucianism did influence a large number of the . . . 
provisions" of the Qing dynasty's codification of the imperial fa, but cautioning 
that "[a]t present it seems that all one can say with certainty is that there is a 
great deal of congruence between the rules of the [Qing] Code and the standards 
of behavior advocated by Confucianists."). 
 139. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 29.  For illustrations drawn from the 
last imperial legal code, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912 C.E.) Code of 1740, see id. 
at 29-43. 
 140. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 228-29. 
 141. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 29, 30, 33-38, 43; Jones, supra 
note 111, at 16-17. 
 142. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 39-41. 
 143. See Keller, supra note 20, at 717. 
 144. EDGAR SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 133 (rev. ed., Grove Press 1968) 
(quoting Mao Zedong). 
 145. See, e.g., FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 651. But see 
KENT, supra note 113, at 36 n*. (offering an alternative origin and original 
meaning of what became the party's name). 
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only a superficial departure from this Confucian pattern.146  After 
consolidating its rule over central China in the late 1920s, the 
Guomindang enacted several legal codes of German-inspired 
design.147  These and related legal reforms had little impact on 
Chinese society, however, both because the writ of the 
Guomindang never extended much beyond the big cities that it 
controlled, and even there often failed to ensure compliance with 
the new laws, and because the domestic chaos and foreign wars 
that plagued the brief life of the Republic otherwise prevented 
effective implementation.148  Even at the apex of the social order, 
the Westernized law adopted by the Republican authorities–even 
before the Guomindang’s comprehensive reform efforts–had about 
as much impact as had the imperial fa, which is to say very little.  
Within two years of his inauguration, the Republic’s first 
permanent President–Yuan Shikai (Yüan Shih-k’ai)149–secured 
 
 146. The Guomindang's efforts echoed a similar attempt made during the final 
years of the Qing Dynasty, when would-be reformers convinced the powers 
behind the throne to accept plans for establishing a putatively constitutional 
monarchy and enacting several European-style legal codes and other laws. See 
KENT, supra note 113, at 14, 164, 171, 191-92; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 
4-7; Keller, supra note 20, at 717-18.  These and other legal reform efforts 
largely came to naught, however, both because traditionalists in the imperial 
court tried to block their implementation, see KENT, supra note 113, at 161; PAN 
WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 8-10; Keller, supra note 20, at 717, and because of 
the chaos that followed the Empire's collapse. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 
43.  Similar reform efforts endorsed a decade earlier by the Emperor himself had 
failed because of similar internal opposition. See CHING, supra note 137, at 56-
57, 64-65, 165-66.  Ironically, at least one scholar has argued that the earlier 
reform movement was inspired by Confucianism. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 63-64. 
 147. Keller, supra note 20, at 718. 
 148. See id. at 718-19; Michael, supra note 106, at 133-34. Cf. FENBY, supra 
note 120, at 230, 291 (noting "the absence of a proper legal system" as one of the 
features of the Republic under Chiang, and the impact of the war with Japan on 
the Republican government's centralization and modernization efforts); LI, 
supra note 132, at 20 (doubting that the Republic's "instant modern Chinese 
law" had much influence beyond the major centers of government and 
commerce, and noting that publicizing and implementing it took a back seat to 
the national government's efforts to deal with domestic turbulence and foreign 
wars).  Even in the early years of the Republic, the central government's 
influence had not penetrated very deeply into Chinese society. See REINSCH, 
supra note 115, at 321. 
 149. Yuan, who took the oath of office as the second Provisional President of 
the Republic in March 1912, was elected and sworn in as the first permanent 
President in October 1913. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 39, 171-72. 
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the constitutional authority to wield absolute power.150  
Subsequent changes to the presidential election law made it 
possible for him to wield this power for life, and to pass it on to 
one of his sons.151  As one Western chronicler observed, these 
legal changes made Yuan “a minor Mussolini in a period when no 
Mussolini had yet emerged for precedent.”152 
The power of both Chiang Kai-shek, Yuan’s last successor on 
the mainland,153 and the political party that he led, were only 
slightly more constrained.154  As head of both the executive and 
the military, Chiang effectively controlled the Republic’s central 
government from an early date, although he did not assume the 
presidency until May 1948, when he was inaugurated as the first 
President under the Republic’s first Constitution.155  That 
constitution,156 adopted nearly twenty years after Chiang’s 
 
 150. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 641, 646; see 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT OF 1914, art. 14 (Republic of China), translated in 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1914 56 (1922), reprinted as revised in PAN WEI-TUNG, THE 
CHINESE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF FORTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN 
CHINA 171 (1945) ("The President is the head of the Nation and combines in 
himself all powers of government."). 
 151. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 201-02; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 28-29; 
see also FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 646 ("By the end of 
1915 [Yuan] was president for life, emperor in all but name."). 
 152. LYON SHARMAN, SUN YAT-SEN:  HIS LIFE AND ITS MEANING 203 (1934). 
 153. As a string of Communist victories in the protracted Chinese civil war 
made the Guomindang's hold on the mainland increasingly untenable, President 
Chiang purported to turn over power to his vice president without clearly 
relinquishing the presidency, but continued to control events from behind the 
scenes before fleeing the mainland to reestablish his government on the island 
of Taiwan. See FENBY, supra note 120, at 488-98. 
 154. Cf. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 849 (arguing that 
in Chiang Kai-shek, the "[Nationalist] party dictatorship [of the late Chinese 
Republic] has its indispensable leader, the one man at the top to give final 
answers."); FENBY, supra note 120, at 185-86 (observing that soon after the 
Guomindang consolidated its power it became clear that China's legal system 
would be subject to its interests); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298 
(describing Chiang as the "indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like 
emperors of old."). 
 155. See Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional Development and Reform in the 
Republic of China on Taiwan (with Documents) 9, 14 (OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. No. 115, 1993); FENBY, supra 
note 120, at 231, 390, 479. 
 156. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1947, as modified by temporary 
provisions 1948-91, and amended 1991 & 1992), translated in Hungdah Chiu, 
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consolidation of power over the parts of China controlled by the 
Guomindang,157 formally confirmed the President’s expansive 
powers.158  It also resurrected in nominally republican form an 
ancient Chinese institution–the Censorate (yushitai, but later 
duchayuan)–the principal function of which had been to uncover 
and to report directly to the Emperor any failure of his 
bureaucrats to fulfill their duties, although the censors also could 
exercise the Confucian scholar’s prerogative of gently pointing out 
to the Emperor any shortcomings in his own behavior.159  
Although the revival of this institution–known in Republican 
China as the Control Yuan (jiancha yuan)160–signified the 
endurance of the Confucian preoccupation with using the law as a 
means of policing the behavior of state bureaucrats,161 it signified 
little if any retreat from the equally Confucian principle that the 
supreme ruler is and should be above the law.162  The 
Constitution purportedly subjected even the President to the 
Control Yuan’s jurisdiction, but the “temporary” constitutional 
provisions promulgated by Chiang’s government just ten days 
before his inauguration, which were to be effective for the 
duration of what the Guomindang considered to be a Communist 
 
Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan 
(with Documents) 42 (OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN 
STUD. No. 115, 1993) [hereinafter ROC CONST., with the date of enactment of 
provisions currently in force noted parenthetically]. 
 157. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 171 (noting Chiang's return with full 
powers to the Republic's capital at Nanking (Nanjing or Nan-ching) in 1928 
after an internal Guomindang power struggle). 
 158. See, e.g., ROC CONST., supra note 156, arts. 35-44 (1947, as amended and 
supplemented 1991). 
 159. Compare id. arts. 90, 95-100 (1947, as amended 1992) (describing the 
control powers of the Control Yuan), with REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 
77, at 168, 200-01, 274, 297-98, 368-69 (describing the role of the Censorate in 
imperial China under the most important dynasties from the Tang through the 
Qing). 
 160. See ROC CONST., supra note 156, art. 100 (1947, as amended 1992). 
 161. Cf. supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (noting the imperial fa's 
Confucian preoccupation with ensuring that the Emperor's bureaucrats 
performed their duties properly). 
 162. Cf. supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining how and why the 
Chinese emperors were above the law in the context of the Confucian legal 
tradition). 
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rebellion, placed him all but beyond the censors’ reach.163  These 
“temporary” provisions were not abrogated until 1991, more than 
fifteen years after Chiang’s death in office and more than forty 
years after he and his government fled the Chinese mainland for 
the island of Taiwan.164  Both the first and last presidents of the 
Chinese Republic on the mainland behaved almost instinctively 
like their imperial predecessors,165 who were unfettered by 
law,166 as one would expect in a society steeped for millennia in 
an essentially Confucian legal tradition.  More importantly, 
 
 163. See TEMPORARY [CONSTITUTIONAL] PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE DURING THE 
PERIOD OF COMMUNIST REBELLION arts. 1-6, 8, 10 (1948, as amended 1960, 1966 
& 1972) (abrogated 1991), translated in Hungdah Chiu, Constitutional 
Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan (with Documents) 
50 (OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. No. 115, 
1993). Cf. Chiu, supra note 155, at 14 (describing the circumstances under 
which the Temporary Provisions were adopted). 
 164. Chiu, supra note 155, at 31. See generally FENBY, supra note 120, at 497-
500 (briefly recounting Chiang's life from his flight to Taiwan in 1949 through 
his death in office in 1975). 
 165. See FENBY, supra note 120, at 98; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 47; 
SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 351. Cf. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 199-200 
(describing certain imperial customs and rituals officially revived by Yuan); 
RHODES FARMER, SHANGHAI HARVEST 168-69 (1945) (recounting an interview in 
which Chiang declared, "I am the State."). See generally REINSCH, supra note 
115, at 186 (paraphrasing a Chinese official of the early Republican era as 
describing the government as essentially functioning like a monarchy 
domestically). But cf. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 133, 201, 228 (quoting Yuan in a 
message to Sun Yat-sen on the day of the Emperor's abdication as pledging 
never to allow "monarchical Government" in China; citing him on another 
occasion as pledging to Heaven and Earth that the monarchy would not be 
restored in China as long as he lived; and describing the decree abolishing 
Yuan's Empire, in which he claimed to have been manipulated by others into 
assuming the throne); REINSCH, supra note 115, at 192-93 (recounting Yuan 
Shikai's deathbed declaration that he had not wanted to become Emperor, but 
had been tricked into believing that the public wanted it and that it was 
necessary for the country).  Mao carried on this tradition while candidly 
acknowledging its ancient cultural roots, if disingenuously claiming to deplore 
its effects. See Edgar Snow, A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung, LIFE, Apr. 30, 
1971, at 46, 46. Cf. JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY 
391 (2005) (“[Mao] was averse to law, and wanted there to be nothing that could 
bind him."); HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 334 (2011) (characterizing Mao's style 
of governance as that of "a traditional emperor of a majestic and awe-inspiring 
kind"); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298 (describing Mao as the 
"indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like emperors of old."). 
 166. Supra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining the inapplicability of 
the imperial fa to the emperors themselves). 
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whatever superficially Western attributes the Chinese legal 
system might have acquired as a result of Republican efforts 
clearly were at odds with the Confucian attitudes toward law that 
persisted among the general population throughout the 
Republican era.167 
The persistence of these attitudes was a natural consequence 
of the endurance of essential elements of the imperial 
Confucianism from which they were derived.  Emperor Wudi 
adopted this form of Confucianism as the official ideology of the 
early Chinese State, and in 124 B.C.E. established an academy 
for training candidates for government posts who would 
demonstrate their fitness for office by passing a civil service 
examination based on the classic Confucian texts.168  
Confucianism retained this official status into the final years of 
the last imperial dynasty–the Qing–which collapsed in 1912, 
when the official examinations were stripped of their signature 
Confucian requirement and then abolished altogether.169  Sun 
Yat-sen (Sun Yixian or Sun I-hsien), the ostensibly Westernized 
revolutionary who took the oath of office as Provisional President 
of the Republic even before the Emperor’s abdication,170 offered a 
harbinger of things to come, however, he reprised an ancient 
ritual almost simultaneously with his successor’s election by 
recounting the events of the revolution in a “prayer” to the spirit 
of the founder of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) at the latter’s 
tomb.171 
 
 167. Cf. supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (arguing that Confucian 
attitudes toward law endured throughout the Republican era). 
 168. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 86-87, 89, 90; REISCHAUER & 
FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 106-07; but cf. id. at 101-08 (arguing that in 
practice Wudi was almost as much of a Legalist as the Qin Dynasty Emperor 
Ying Zheng had been, and that Confucianism emerged as the dominant ideology 
of imperial China only slowly over the course of the Han Dynasty as a whole). 
 169. See KENT, supra note 113, at 15, 32-33; SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 70-
71; CHING, supra note 137, at 57-59.  For a brief account of the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty, see FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 639-41. 
 170. See SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 133.  Sun's propaganda and fund-raising 
skills had played a pivotal role in the revolution that brought down the Qing. Id. 
at 270-71.  For an account of a pivotal phase in his ostensible Westernization, 
see id. at 10-16. 
 171. See, e.g., id. at 140-43.  Sources differ on the timing of this event. 
Compare id. at 140 (placing it the day after the election of Sun's successor), with 
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Less than two years after the Emperor’s abdication, Sun’s 
successor–Yuan Shikai–briefly if ineffectually restored 
Confucianism to official status, despite having failed the official 
examinations repeatedly and not being much of a Confucianist 
himself.172  Yuan performed the ancient imperial rites at the 
Temple of Heaven, albeit with a few small changes meant to 
symbolize China’s reinvention as a republic,173 but then went too 
far by trying to have himself enthroned as Emperor.174  Military 
leaders and provincial governors rebelled, leading Yuan to 
renounce the throne a few months later.175  Less than a decade 
after that, Sun Yat-sen called for a similar Confucian revival, 
arguing that the key to governing China and to freeing it from 
foreign control would be to revive its ancient political philosophy 
in accordance with the Confucian classics.176  Sun’s erstwhile 
protégé Chiang Kai-shek177 twice tried to restore Confucianism to 
official status in the late Republican era, but with similarly 
lackluster results.178 
 
KENT, supra note 113, at 322 (placing it on the morning of the day of the election 
of Sun's successor). 
 172. See CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 14, 15, 200; FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, 
supra note 110, at 640-41, 646, 649-50; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 23. Cf. 
TEMPLE OF HEAVEN DRAFT [CONSTITUTION] of 1913 art. 19 (Republic of China), 
translated in THE CHINA YEARBOOK 490 (H.G.W. Woodward ed., 1914), reprinted 
as revised in PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 157-58 ("The people of the 
Chinese Republic shall have the obligation to undergo primary education 
according to law. In the education of citizens, the doctrine of Confucius shall be 
adopted as the great principle for the regulation of persons."). 
 173. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 646; see also REINSCH, 
supra note 115, at 24-26 (describing the imperial rites as performed by Yuan). 
 174. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 650; REINSCH, 
supra note 115, at 171-75, 179. 
 175. CH'ÊN, supra note 96, at 228; FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 
110, at 651; PAN WEI-TUNG, supra note 119, at 30; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 
180, 182.  Ironically, the name that had been chosen for Yuan's imperial reign 
was Hong Xian (Hung Hsien) – or "Great Constitutional Era." Id. at 186. 
 176. See SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 41-44. 
 177. Cf. FENBY, supra note 120, at 56 (describing events that established 
Chiang as a "loyal right-hand man for Sun," and as giving rise to their deep 
personal rapport). 
 178. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 706, 713; FENBY, 
supra note 120, at 246-47, 248. Cf. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, supra note 121, at 156, 
186-87, 190-93 (expounding on the cultivation of traditional Confucian values as 
essential to national salvation, and on the value of Confucianism as a means of 
restoring order in the Chinese state); FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra 
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The failure of these prominent efforts to restore 
Confucianism to official status was a natural–perhaps inevitable–
consequence of the organic link between its former standing as 
the official ideology of the Chinese State and the imperial system 
per se, which had broken down irretrievably during the long, slow 
collapse of the Qing.179  The success or failure of these efforts is 
much less important, however, than the fact that throughout the 
Republic’s brief life the Chinese people continued to live their own 
lives more or less as they had done for millennia–that is, in 
accordance with the Confucian behavioral norms that had served 
as the touchstone of Chinese culture since the reign of Emperor 
Wudi, albeit increasingly shorn of their specifically imperial 
connotations.180  Mao Zedong considered Chinese culture to be so 
 
note 110, at 717 (arguing that Chiang Kai-shek's losing quest to save China 
from Communist domination "was damaged less by inadequacies of virtue than 
by an excess of virtues that were out of date . . . .  His inflexible rectitude 
mirrored the inertia of a whole political tradition, still in the shadow of the 
Confucian monarchy."); FENBY, supra note 120, at 253 ("[T]he nearest Chiang 
came to expounding a creed was in a meld of Confucian classicism and 
Methodism that had little relevance to the real problems facing the nation."). 
 179. Cf. FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 649, 692, 713 
(arguing that "the ancient Confucian ethical sanctions and the ceremonial forms 
of imperial rule had lost their potency" by the early Republican era, 
characterizing the "old domestic traditions" of China as "bankrupt" by the late 
Republican era, and criticizing the Confucian "traditionalism" of Chiang Kai-
shek's political manifesto as "invok[ing] ideas even more out-of-date" than Mao 
Zedong's rival ideology); REINSCH, supra note 115, at 272-85 (detailing the ill-
fated attempt by an imperial general to restore the last Qing Emperor to the 
throne, and asserting that both it and Yuan Shikai's earlier attempted 
assumption of the throne "actually served to entrench more deeply the 
republican form of government."); Keller, supra note 20, at 717 (arguing that 
"[t]he upheavals of the nineteenth century brought an end to the dominance of 
Confucian orthodoxy within China," which led many Chinese intellectuals to call 
for a constitutional form of government); Michael, supra note 106, at 132-33 
(noting that faith in the "Confucian system" largely had been lost even before 
the collapse of the Qing); but cf. REINSCH, supra note 115, at 275 (describing 
Beijing's population as showing "an almost joyous excitement" following the 
brief restoration of the last Qing Emperor to the throne after the death of the 
Republic's first permanent President). 
 180. Cf., e.g., REINSCH, supra note 115, at 24 (quoting the Minister of the 
Interior of the early Republic on how it would be "dangerous" for the Republican 
government "to neglect the worship of Heaven" because of the likely reaction of 
the rural population in the event of a bad harvest).  For Emperor Wudi's 
contributions to the rise of Confucianism as the touchstone of traditional 
Chinese culture, see supra notes 83-88, 168 and accompanying text. 
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saturated with Confucianism that even before proclaiming the 
founding of the PRC in 1949 he launched a decades-long crusade 
to eradicate it.181 
III. THE ENDURANCE OF THE CONFUCIAN 
ESSENCE OF THE CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION 
IN THE PRC, AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRC’S WESTERN-
STYLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
Like all cultural phenomena, legal traditions change over 
time.  “Culture moves rather like an octopus,” the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz once observed, “not all at once . . . but by 
disjointed movements of this part, then that, and now the other 
which somehow cumulate to directional change.”182  As a result, 
no one should expect the Chinese legal tradition today to be the 
same as it was during the Qing Dynasty, much less during the 
Han.  The Confucian essence of that tradition clearly has 
endured, however, and has been reinforced by socialist legal 
theory in at least one crucial respect.  The endurance of this 
Confucian essence is a function of the endurance of the broader 
Confucian culture of which it is an expression,183 despite Mao’s 
best efforts to purge the PRC of every Confucian influence.184 
Mao’s professed hostility toward Confucianism had early 
roots.  Although the younger Mao studied the Confucian classics 
in primary school, and also later under the tutelage of an elderly 
scholar, he disliked them, and preferred to read just about 
anything else.185  The elder Mao–who had attended only two 
years of school but had become relatively prosperous by buying 
 
 181. See MAO TSE-TUNG, ON NEW DEMOCRACY 1 n.1, 59-60 (1954) [hereinafter 
MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY]. 
 182. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 408 (1973). 
 183. Cf. R. P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights? Toward a 
Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 32 
(1993) [hereinafter Peerenboom 1993] ("Confucianism continues even today to 
be the basis of the Chinese world view, despite the attempts of the socialist 
government [in the early 1990s] to eradicate such 'feudal' thinking."). 
 184. Cf. supra note 181 and infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text 
(noting the early start and describing the development and peak of Mao's 
decades-long, anti-Confucian crusade). 
 185. See SNOW, supra note 144, at 131, 133-34, 135 (quoting Mao Zedong). 
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grain from poor peasants and transporting it to the city for sale to 
merchants at a profit–disapproved of his son’s reading habits, 
arguing that by mastering the classics the younger Mao could 
have helped his father to win lawsuits.186  By the time Mao 
Zedong had risen to lead the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 
its uneasy alliance with the Guomindang during the Anti-
Japanese War (1937-45), Mao was denouncing “the worship of 
Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, the old ethical code 
and the old ideologies” as symptoms of a “semi-feudal culture” 
that together had “formed a reactionary cultural alliance [with 
imperialist culture that] . . . serves the imperialists and the 
feudal class and must be swept away.”187 
Mao’s anti-Confucian crusade reached its peak during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76).188  Confucius and Mencius were 
pilloried in pamphlets and the press,189 which linked the Master 
and his most illustrious disciple with the “bourgeois careerist, 
conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor” Lin Biao (Lin 
Piao),190 whom Mao had purged in the early 1970s as a threat to 
his own power.191  Some of these polemics focused on the 
opposition of Confucius and his followers to the Legalists,192 
albeit as proxies for opponents and supporters of Mao’s radical 
 
 186. Id. at 131, 133-34 (quoting Mao Zedong). 
 187. MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 181, at 1 n.1, 59-60. 
 188. See generally THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 224 (Joseph 
W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006). 
 189. See, e.g., 1 YANG JUNG-KUO ET AL., SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN 
PIAO AND CONFUCIUS (1974) [hereinafter ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1]; 2 
YANG JUNG-KUO ET AL., SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS 
(1975) [hereinafter ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 2]. 
 190. ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra note 189, at Publisher's Note; 
ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 2, supra note 189, at Publisher's Note.  
Ironically, Lin Biao had compiled Mao's "Little Red Book" of quotations. E.g., 
KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 268. 
 191. See, e.g., CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at 552-64. 
 192. See Lo Szu-ting, Evolution of the Debate Between the Confucians and 
Legalists as Seen from Wang An-shih's Reform – On Reading A Brief Study of 
the Biography of Wang Ching Kung, in ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra 
note 189, at 185; Lo Szu-ting, Struggle Between Restoration and Counter-
Restoration in the Course of Founding the Chin Dynasty – In Relation to the 
Social Basis of the Polemics Between the Confucianist and Legalist Schools, in 
ARTICLES CRITICIZING CONFUCIUS 1, supra note 189, at 107. 
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political program, respectively.193  Amid the relentless anti-
Confucian propaganda of the era,194 even school children were 
required to write poems “exposing” Confucius and Lin Biao.195 
Yet the appeal of Confucianism as a cultural touchstone for 
the masses was fated to survive this onslaught largely intact, as 
even Mao seemed to realize near the end of his life.196  One 
incident stands out as especially prophetic.  In August 1966, a 
band of Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards, inspired by Mao’s call 
to destroy the Four Olds (si jiu)–Old Thought, Old Culture, Old 
Customs, and Old Habits197–massed outside the Confucian 
Temple complex in Qufu (Ch’ü-fu), the hometown of both 
Confucius and Mencius, intending to smash it to bits.198  Local 
peasants, students, militia members, and government officials 
joined forces to fight off the young zealots, leaving them battered 
and humiliated but no less eager to achieve their goal.199  After a 
three-month siege of the complex, with their ranks swelled by 
hundreds of reinforcements from Beijing, the red guards attacked 
again, forcing the defenders to surrender, and sacking the 
 
 193. See Shao-chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China 
as Reflecting Mao Tse-tung's Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 369-
73 (1977). 
 194. See GEORGE H. W. BUSH, CHINA DIARY OF GEORGE H. W. BUSH 30-31 
(Jeffrey A. Engel ed., 2008). Cf. JAMES LILLEY WITH JEFFREY LILLEY, CHINA 
HANDS 176 (2004) (noting that the "popular slogan" at the time of the official 
opening of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing in 1973 was "Criticize Lin, Criticize 
Confucius"). 
 195. BUSH, supra note 194, at 336. 
 196. See Dahpon David Ho, To Protect and Preserve:  Resisting the Destroy the 
Four Olds Campaign, 1966-1967, in THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS 
HISTORY 64, 92 (Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz & Andrew G. Walder 
eds., 2006). Cf. KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 110 (noting that when during their 
historic summit meeting in 1972 President Richard Nixon complimented Mao on 
the success of his efforts to transform China's ancient civilization, Mao replied, 
"I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in 
the vicinity of Beijing."). But cf. Ho, supra, at 85-89 (quoting the county official 
who led local residents in an effort to protect the most important Confucian 
historical sites from destruction by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution 
as recalling, "The Three Confucian Sites were treasures of China–we weren't 
defending Confucius, we were defending our country's cultural relics."). 
 197. Ho, supra note 196, at 65-66. 
 198. Id. at 86. 
 199. Id. at 64, 84, 85-86, 86-87. 
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Confucius family tombs.200  The local residents and officials 
succeeded in protecting other parts of the complex from 
destruction, however, with the help of at least two highly placed 
CPC officials in Beijing.201 
Mao’s death in 1976 finally brought the Cultural Revolution 
to an end.202  By 1980, Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsao-p’ing) (1904-
97), who had sought to moderate the effects of Mao’s culture war 
after Mao summoned him back from internal exile in 1973,203 had 
consolidated his power as China’s new supreme leader.204  Under 
Deng’s leadership, the PRC soon adopted a new constitution.205  
This Constitution affirms that the Chinese State seeks to build a 
“socialist spiritual civilization” (shehuizhuyi jingshen 
wenming),206 a goal officially endorsed by Deng at the Twelfth 
National Party Congress three months before the adoption of the 
Constitution itself.207  The Constitution sheds little light on the 
meaning of this term,208 except perhaps indirectly in its 
preamble, which declares that the Chinese people “will continue 
to . . . follow the socialist road” under “the guidance of Marxism-
 
 200. Id. at 64, 84-85, 86, 88, 89-90, 90-91, 92. 
 201. See id. at 90, 91-92. Cf. id. at 88-89 (describing the local defenders' efforts 
during the siege to forestall the destruction of the sites). 
 202. Cf. Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz & Andrew G. Walder, The 
Chinese Cultural Revolution as History: An Introduction, in THE CHINESE 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 1, 1 (Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz 
& Andrew G. Walder eds., 2006) (noting that the military repression and 
campaigns of political persecution associated with the Cultural Revolution 
began to fade in the early 1970s, but that China remained politically unstable 
until Mao's death, with effects that stretched into the early 1980s). 
 203. CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at 612-14. 
 204. See KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 329-39. 
 205. PRC CONST., supra note 5. 
 206. Id. art. 24 (1982). 
 207. See 12th National Party Congress Opens, BEIJING REV., Sept. 6, 1982, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/90th/2011-07/01/content_373426.htm#. Cf. DENG 
XIAOPING, Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (Sept. 
1, 1982), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 394, 396 (Bureau 
for the Compilation & Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin & Stalin 
under the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, 1984) (translating the 
phrase as "socialist civilization"). See generally RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO:  
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING 143-44 (1996) (recounting the 
origin of the term). 
 208. See PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 24 (1982) (“The state strengthens the 
building of socialist spiritual civilization . . . ."). 
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Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the 
important thought of ‘Three Represents.’”209  Thirty years later, 
however, it has become clear that the PRC’s “socialist spiritual 
civilization” is imbued with precious little socialism, which for the 
bulk of the Chinese population has little normative appeal,210 but 
also is suffused with a heavy dose of Confucianism.211  Since 
2004, the Central Government has underscored the salience of 
Confucian values in contemporary China by helping to establish 
more than three hundred Confucius Institutes at colleges and 
universities in more than ninety countries and regions around the 
world, with more than sixty in the United States alone.212  These 
institutes promote the Chinese language and traditional Chinese 
culture, including key Confucian values such as benevolence, 
righteousness, and harmony,213 if not Confucianism per se.214  Hu 
 
 209. Compare id. art. 24 (1982), with id. at pmbl., para. 3 (1982), and id. 
amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004) (amending the preamble in relevant part).  Until 1999, 
when the reference to Deng Xiaoping Theory was added, the Constitution cited 
only Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Compare id. amend. III, 
paras. 1-2 (1999) (amending "paragraph seven" [sic] of the preamble), with id. 
amend. II, ¶ 3 (1993) (amending the preamble), and id. pmbl., para. 3 (1982).  
The reference to PRC President Jiang Zemin's (1993-2003) "Three Represents" 
was added in 2004. See id. amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004). See generally PEERENBOOM, 
supra note 53, at 237 n.166 (explaining the meaning and limited impact of the 
"Three Represents," also translated as the "Three Representatives").  Of these 
four ideologies, Deng Xiaoping Theory has become the most important by far as 
a practical matter. Cf. Maria Hsia Chang, The Thought of Deng Xiaoping, 29 
COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 376, 377-78, 384-86 (1996) (arguing that 
Deng Xiaoping Theory, which as "theory" has been elevated by the Chinese 
Communist Party to a status equal to that of Marxism and Leninism, has 
guided China's economic modernization and the revival of Chinese nationalism 
by transforming Marxism into an ideology of developmental nationalism). 
 210. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 170-71, 407. 
 211. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 44-45; Peerenboom 1993, supra note 183, at 
32; but see PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 171, 407 (asserting that the 
Communist Party's efforts to create a "socialist spiritual civilization," which 
includes "praise for the indigenous and illustrious tradition of Confucianism," 
and to "revitalize Confucianism," have been "largely ineffectual"). 
 212. See, e.g., Liu Chang, No Need to Fuss over Confucius Institutes, CHINA 
DAILY, Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-08/14/content_ 
11152936.htm; China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2011, at 52. 
 213. Liu Chang, supra note 212. Cf., e.g., CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. I, ¶ 
12, bk. IV, ¶ 16 (quoting a discipline of Confucius as identifying harmony as the 
most valuable thing brought about by following the li, and quoting Confucius 
himself as asserting that "[t]he gentleman is versed in what is moral," whereas 
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Jintao (Hu Chin-t’ao), who as both General Secretary of the 
CPC’s Central Committee (2002-12) and PRC President (2003-13) 
embraced the ancient Confucian concept of a xiaokang 
(hsiaok’ang)–or moderately well-off–lifestyle to define his near-
term vision for Chinese society, has been a prime mover behind 
these and other official efforts to revive Confucianism in the PRC, 
as have his Premier Wen Jiabao (Wen Chia-pao) (2003-13) and 
the CPC generally.215  The irony of these developments in a 
country that still purports to be guided by Mao Zedong Thought is 
almost palpable.216  As if to highlight this irony, the authorities 
erected a huge bronze statue of Confucius in Tiananmen (T’ien-an 
Men) Square in January 2011, within a stone’s throw of Mao’s 
mausoleum.217 
Notwithstanding these developments, the PRC is not the 
Empire, in which the State threw its full weight behind imperial 
Confucianism as the ideological focal point of civic life.218  As if to 
 
"[t]he small man is versed in what is profitable," respectively); MENCIUS, supra 
note 81, at bk. I, pt. A, ¶ 1 (quoting Mencius as arguing that benevolence and 
rightness are all that matter, and are more important than profit). 
 214. See China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212, 
at 52. 
 215. See Confucius and the Party Line, ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 38; 
Confucius Makes a Comeback, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 48. Cf. HU JINTAO, 
HOLD HIGH THE GREAT BANNER OF SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS AND 
STRIVE FOR NEW VICTORIES IN BUILDING A MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY IN 
ALL RESPECTS: REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON OCT. 15, 2007 § IV (2007), available at 
www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm (acknowledging the steady 
progress that had been made toward achieving “the goal of building a 
moderately prosperous society in all respects" set at the previous National Party 
Congress in 2002, and setting forth "new requirements" for attaining that goal).  
See generally KISSINGER, supra note 165, at 490-91, 563 n.3 (summarizing the 
Confucian revival under Hu and Wen).  President Jiang Zemin's (Chiang Tse-
min's) (1993-2003) earlier efforts to promote the rule of virtue (dezhi) in the PRC 
also had Confucian overtones. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 237 n.166. 
 216. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, amend. IV, § 1 (2004) (revising paragraph 2 
of the preamble to read in relevant part, "Under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of ‘Three 
Represents’, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the 
people's democratic dictatorship, [and] follow the socialist road . . . ."). 
 217. See China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212. 
 218. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 170, 407 (arguing in 2002 that 
"traditional normative systems such as Confucianism . . . have withered" in 
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underscore the difference, the authorities removed the statue of 
Confucius from Tiananmen Square four months after its 
installation after more than sixty percent of respondents to an 
online poll conducted by the People’s Daily–the CPC newspaper–
opposed its presence there.219  Yet Confucianism clearly remains 
a powerful force in Chinese society, even at the highest levels, as 
its promotion by those at the pinnacles of both CPC and state 
power attests.220 
The Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition seems to 
have been just as durable.221  The PRC’s legal system continues 
to exhibit many of the Confucian hallmarks of its imperial and 
Republican predecessors.222  For example, China’s legal 
institutions remain relatively primitive by Western standards.223  
Although there is much more law per se in China today than 
there was during the Empire, and especially since the death of 
 
China after being "[u]nder attack for the last fifty years," and that "the Party's 
efforts over the years to destroy traditional normative systems such as 
Confucianism . . . have taken their toll" such that its efforts to "revitalize 
Confucianism" as a means of arresting China's moral decay "have been largely 
ineffectual"); Peerenboom 1993, supra note 183, at 32 (acknowledging that 
"Confucianism is not the only intellectual influence" on "the Chinese world 
view"). 
 219. See Andrew Jacobs, Confucius Statute Vanishes Near Tiananmen Square, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/ 
23confucius.html (reporting on the removal of the statue four months later); 
China's Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, supra note 212. 
 220. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text. 
 221. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 45; Keller, supra note 20, at 712, 714-15; Yu 
Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 32. Cf. CHOW, supra note 94, at 62 ("China's 
current legal system represents in many ways a break with Confucianism . . . . 
However, while it is one matter to formally break with traditions, it is another 
matter to completely overcome the influence of traditions so deeply embedded in 
centuries of Chinese culture."); REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 31 
("Communism represents only the latest of a series of assaults on old concepts 
and social institutions [in China]. Some aspects of traditional society may 
survive better than others – for example, the . . . emphasis on ethics rather than 
law."). 
 222. But cf. Keller, supra note 20, at 714 (asserting that "[t]here is little overt 
evidence of a direct link between China's imperial legal order and the one more 
recently established under the People's Republic of China," except for a few 
conceptual and organizational terms embedded in PRC legislation). 
 223. See generally PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 12-17, 239-449 (surveying 
the PRC's legislative system, judiciary, legal profession, and administrative law 
regime). 
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Mao, most of the impetus for law-making has come from the 
Central Government’s desire to modernize China’s economy, to 
attract foreign investment, and to be accepted for membership in 
the World Trade Organization.224  Scholars estimate that at least 
seventy percent of all laws proposed in the NPC, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC, and the State Council during the first 
wave of post-Mao legal reforms in the 1980s were economic 
laws.225  In fact, China’s Legislation Law, which was enacted in 
2000 and governs the enactment, revision, and nullification of all 
other statutes, regulations, and rules in the PRC, declares that 
“[l]aws shall be made in compliance with the . . . principle[ ] of 
taking economic development as the central task . . . .”226  
Significantly, the structural incoherence of this increasingly 
voluminous body of law rivals that of the imperial fa, with CPC 
and State policy–and perhaps traditional Chinese values–giving 
its content the consistency that imperial Confucianism once gave 
to the law of the Empire.227 
 
 224. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 59-61. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 49 
("The disastrous Cultural Revolution [of the Mao era] made it clear to all that 
China needed to rebuild its legal system to limit government arbitrariness and 
provide the predictability and certainty required to attract foreign investors and 
grow the economy."); Keller, supra note 20, at 713 (partly attributing the CPC's 
pursuit of legal modernization beginning in 1978 to the recognition by Chinese 
leaders that trade and investment legislation would be needed to attract foreign 
investors to the PRC). 
 225. CHOW, supra note 94, at 326-27.  For a summary of the major PRC laws of 
relevance to commercial activity, see id. at 327-58.  For the relationship between 
the NPC and its Standing Committee, see supra note 19.  The State Council 
functions as both the executive body of the NPC and the highest organ of state 
administration. PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 85 (1982). Cf. id. art. 57 
(identifying the NPC as the "highest organ of state power").  It may exercise any 
function or power that the NPC or its Standing Committee authorizes it to 
exercise, but also may "adopt administrative measures, enact administrative 
rules and regulations, and issue decisions and orders" on its own authority. Id. 
art. 89, §§ 1, 18 (1982). 
 226. Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Nat'l 
People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, promulgated by Order No. 31 of the President 
P.R.C., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 3, translated in ASIAN LEGAL 
INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www. 
asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ll145/ (P.R.C.). 
 227. See Keller, supra note 20, at 717, 729. Cf. id. at 732-38 (describing the 
complexity of the PRC's legislative hierarchy and its negative implications for 
the coherence of Chinese law). 
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Law in the PRC also remains unusually punitive by Western 
standards.  For example, PRC law permits the death penalty to 
be imposed for dozens of offenses, almost two-thirds of them 
nonviolent.228  Capital punishment remains popular with the 
public, and even opponents acknowledge that its ongoing 
popularity among many Chinese citizens is a function of deeply-
rooted cultural beliefs about retributive justice and the death 
penalty’s deterrent value.229  The PRC’s environmental statutes 
include special provisions that prescribe administrative 
punishments for state bureaucrats for abuse of authority or 
dereliction of duty in carrying out their environmental 
supervisory or administrative responsibilities, even if their 
unlawful behavior is neither criminal nor fraudulent, nor for 
personal gain.230  The remedy for these purely administrative 
transgressions is not merely the setting aside of an action 
unlawfully taken or the compulsion of an action unreasonably 
delayed or unlawfully withheld, as one would expect in the 
West.231  A separate statute–the Administrative Punishments 
Law,232 which the National People’s Congress adopted in part to 
ensure effective state administration233–provides in relevant part 
for the administrative punishment of governmental officials for a 
 
 228. Reducing Death Penalty Crimes in China More Symbol than Substance, 
DIALOGUE, Fall 2010, at 1, available at http://duihua.org/work/publications/nl 
/nl_pdf/nl_41.pdf.  In 2010, the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress started to consider a proposed amendment to the law that would 
remove from the list thirteen economic crimes for which the death penalty has 
been imposed rarely, if ever. Id. at 1-2. 
 229. Id. at 1, 3. 
 230. See PRC Solid Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 67; PRC Envtl. Effects 
Evaluation Law, supra note 27, arts. 28, 30, 32, 35; PRC Atmospheric Pollution 
Law, supra note 28, art. 65; PRC Marine Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 
94; PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 62; PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, 
supra note 21, art. 45.  One other environmental statute includes a similar 
provision that refers merely to punishments prescribed by law. See PRC Water 
Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 69. 
 231. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (defining the 
scope of judicial review of the actions of administrative agencies). 
 232. Administrative Punishments Law (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., 
Mar. 17, 1996, promulgated by Order No. 63 of the President P.R.C., Mar. 17, 
1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996), translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/ 
laws/apl330/ (P.R.C.). 
 233. See id. art. 1. 
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broad array of purely administrative transgressions, including 
the failure to check or to punish the unlawful acts of others.234 
As these punitive provisions suggest, PRC law also remains 
disproportionately aimed at policing the behavior of state 
bureaucrats, at least by Western standards.  Many laws are 
internal or otherwise not accessible to the general public for that 
reason.235  At least one Western scholar of Chinese law has 
discerned in this lack of transparency a cultural legacy of the 
imperial Confucianism in which the Emperor’s bureaucrats were 
steeped, which was based in part on the Mencian belief that 
human beings are naturally good, and which therefore meant 
that those bureaucrats could be trusted to behave appropriately 
without public supervision.236  The provisions of the PRC’s laws 
that are concerned with punishing government officials are aimed 
primarily at subordinate officials, however.  The PRC’s senior 
leaders, and the CPC generally, remain wholly or partly above 
the law,237 as was Mao,238 the President of the Chinese Republic 
and the Guomindang, and the Emperors and mandarins of old.239 
Most importantly, the current attitudes of the Chinese people 
toward law differ hardly at all from the attitudes of their imperial 
and Republican ancestors.  For the bulk of the PRC’s population, 
law in the Western sense remains almost as alien an institution 
as ever, neither highly regarded nor often sought out as a means 
 
 234. See generally id. arts. 55-58, 61-62. Cf. id. arts. 59-60 (providing for the 
administrative punishment of administrative officials for certain tort-like acts). 
 235. See HEAD & WANG, supra note 63, at 237 (quoting an e-mail message from 
R. Randal Edwards to J. W. Head, Apr. 10, 2003). 
 236. See id. at 237, 237 n.35 (quoting an e-mail message from R. Randal 
Edwards to J. W. Head, Apr. 10, 2003). 
 237. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 132, 214-15, 217, 419.  This weakness 
endures despite a 1999 constitutional amendment asserting that the PRC is 
ruled in accordance with law. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, amend. III, para. 3 
(1999) (adding as a new "first section" of article 5, entitled "The People's 
Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and 
building a socialist country of law."). 
 238. Cf. REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 298 (describing Mao as the 
"indispensable foc[us] of final power, somewhat like emperors of old.").  In fact, 
Mao's style of governance amounted to "a version of Confucian tradition through 
the looking glass" in that it claimed to represent a radical departure from the 
past, but relied on many traditional Chinese institutions. KISSINGER, supra note 
165, at 94-95. 
 239. See supra notes 134, 149-66 and accompanying text. 
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of resolving disputes or solving social problems.240  An extreme if 
peculiarly cyber-age manifestation of the extent to which the 
Chinese rely on non-legal mechanisms to enforce social norms is 
the recent rise of the “human-flesh search engine” (renrou sousuo 
yinqing), in which groups of ordinary Chinese citizens punish 
perceived social deviants by identifying and shaming them online, 
with the intention of mobilizing others to isolate them socially 
and otherwise to punish them offline.241  Even to the extent that 
Chinese citizens do turn to the law, they seem as eager as their 
imperial forebears to temper its application with extralegal 
factors such as the relationship and circumstances of the parties 
and prevailing notions of justice.242  The contrast with the West 
in that regard is stark.243  To the extent that law has come to 
play a more important role in maintaining social and political 
order in China since 1978 than it did historically, that 
achievement is a function of the partial Westernization of 
Chinese legal institutions in the face of a much older and more 
robust Chinese legal tradition.244 
The PRC insists that its legal system is socialist, despite its 
many Confucian attributes.245  Whatever the merits of this 
 
 240. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 20, at 712; Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 
50. 
 241. See Tom Downey, China's Cyberposse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html. 
 242. See Keller, supra note 20, at 714-15. 
 243. Cf. RACHEL KLEINFELD BELTON, COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF THE RULE OF 
LAW 9-10 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series No. 55, 
2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index. 
cfm?fa=view&id=16405 (exploring the role of equality before the law in the 
Western rule of law concept). 
 244. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 64-66. Cf. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 
161 ("By and large, . . . PRC scholars agree that China's traditional 'rule of man' 
culture not only has precious few features that support rule of law but that it 
constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to the realization of rule of law."); but cf. 
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping's China, 11 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 469, 472 (1997) (arguing that "foreign legal concepts and 
traditions have been adapted within a broader framework of Marxian rule and 
have been accommodated to the basic principles of socialism" in the PRC). 
 245. See, e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 5 (1982) ("The state upholds the 
uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system."). Cf. id. amend. III, paras. 
2-3 (1999); id. at amend. IV, ¶ 1 (2004) (revising "paragraph seven" [sic] of the 
preamble to read in relevant part, "The basic task of the nation is to concentrate 
its efforts on socialist modernization by following along the road of Chinese-style 
45
  
2013] CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 1201 
 
official claim, it would be a misnomer to characterize socialist 
legal theory in China as synonymous with the Chinese legal 
tradition in the way that one might have characterized socialist 
legal theory in the Soviet Union, for example, as synonymous 
with the Soviet legal tradition.246  Socialist legal theory never had 
the chance to put down the cultural roots in the PRC that it did in 
the Soviet Union because of the fundamentally different roles 
that law played in the founding and subsequent evolution of the 
Soviet and PRC States.247  The responsibility for its failure to put 
down cultural roots in China lies primarily with Mao.  Although 
Mao studied in the home of an unemployed law student for six 
months while in his mid-teens, and a few years later registered 
for but never attended a law school,248 he lacked Lenin’s formal 
legal training and experience as a practicing lawyer.249  Law 
played a central role in Lenin’s critiques of the tsarist regime and 
 
socialism.  Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the 
guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory 
and the important thought of 'Three Represents,' the Chinese people of all 
nationalities will continue to . . . improve the socialist legal system . . . ," and 
adding as a new "first section" to article 5 "The People's Republic of China 
practices ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a socialist 
country of law."). 
 246. But cf. Lo, supra note 244, at 472 (asserting in the late 1990s that the 
"tradition of 'socialist law'" remained important in the PRC). 
 247. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the relationship 
between a society's legal tradition and its legal culture). 
 248. SNOW, supra note 144, at 134-35, 143 (quoting Mao Zedong). 
 249. None of Mao's contemporaries in the senior Party leadership were 
lawyers either. PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44.  Lenin, however, studied 
jurisprudence at the Imperial Kazan University until his participation in a 
demonstration against state control of the university and the strict regulation of 
student life led to his expulsion part way through his first year. ROBERT 
SERVICE, LENIN: A BIOGRAPHY 63, 67-69 (2000).  He later passed the 
jurisprudence exams as an external student at the Imperial St. Petersburg 
University, where he was the only student in his class to earn the highest 
possible grade in every subject. Id. at 82-84, 85-86.  After graduation, he 
practiced law as an assistant barrister for a year and a half in Samara before 
moving back to St. Petersburg to take up the cause of revolution full time. Id. at 
86, 89; see also id. at 91-93 (recounting Lenin's registration as an assistant to a 
barrister after moving back to St. Petersburg, but noting that "[h]is legal work 
went no further than occasional informal advice to friends and associates.").  His 
arguments before the court in Samara were reputed to be first-rate. See Jane 
Burbank, Lenin and the Law in Revolutionary Russia, 54 SLAVIC REV. 23, 25 
(1995). 
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of the Provisional Government that briefly succeeded it,250 and 
also loomed large in the Bolsheviks’ efforts to consolidate and 
legitimize their rule after their seizure of power in October 
1917.251  The Chinese Communists took a very different tack.  In 
the rural areas that they controlled before 1949, Mao and his 
followers essentially replaced the pre-existing legal system with 
an administrative one, in which the decrees of CPC leaders 
established simple norms of political and social behavior.252  
Although the CPC’s Central Committee purported to abolish all 
Guomindang legislation even before the official founding of the 
PRC, it also decreed that CPC policy would control in the absence 
of new laws to replace the old.253  For the most part, these policy 
directives served as a substitute for a formal legal system for the 
PRC’s first few years.254  When the Chinese Communists finally 
turned to building a formal legal system in the early 1950s, they 
imported Soviet legal theory for the purpose.255  Yet even their 
efforts to lay the foundation for a socialist Chinese legal culture 
based on this foreign legal theory soon came to naught.  By the 
mid-1950s, Mao openly disdained even Stalin’s legal system as an 
inherent constraint on class struggle.256  Mao preferred to 
regulate social behavior through the internalization of social 
norms inculcated through education and mass participation in a 
politicized legal process and enforced by social pressures rather 
than through the enforcement by bureaucratic institutions of 
 
 250. See Burbank, supra note 249, at 25-29, 30-34. 
 251. See id. at 36-42.  Lenin himself drafted most of the first legal decrees to 
be issued by the new Soviet government. See SERVICE, supra note 249, at 313-15, 
316-18, 321. 
 252. See Keller, supra note 20, at 719. 
 253. Id.; see also Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 33 (reproducing in 
translation an excerpt from the Party's February 1949 "Instructions" on the 
abrogation and criticism of the Guomindang laws). 
 254. See Keller, supra note 20, at 719.  The Chinese Communists acted with 
Bolshevik-like dispatch in establishing a constitutional basis for their state, 
however. Compare id. at 719-20 (summarizing the Chinese Communists' 
efforts), with Burbank, supra note 249, at 37-39, 38-39 n.68 (describing the 
context and consequences of the Bolsheviks' early efforts). 
 255. See Keller, supra note 20, at 720. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 
36-37 (describing the PRC's "large-scale adoption . . . of Soviet legal institutions 
and Soviet legal thought" in the 1950s with the help of Soviet legal advisers, but 
noting that the adoption of the former was "qualified" from the outset). 
 256. Lo, supra note 244, at 473. 
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codified legal rules.257  Beginning with the “anti-rightist 
campaign” (fan youpai yundong) of 1957, which nipped the liberal 
“hundred flowers movement” (baihua yundong) of the previous 
year in the bud,258 Mao systematically gutted the PRC’s nascent 
socialist legal system, dismantling the Ministry of Justice, 
transferring much of the procuracy’s259 functions to the state 
security organs, and persecuting judges, lawyers, and legal 
scholars who argued for greater legal control over the CPC, many 
of whom were banished to the countryside to “learn from the 
peasants.”260  Politics eclipsed law as the staple of Chinese legal 
education and in the content of those legal journals that 
continued to publish anything at all.261  The NPC’s legislative 
activities ground to a halt, and would not resume for another 
twenty years.262  After a brief revival in the early 1960s, the 
fortunes of the legal system sunk even lower during the official 
 
 257. See Leng, supra note 193, at 356-57. 
 258. In 1956, Mao tried to revive China's flagging socialist revolution by 
calling on Chinese intellectuals to "let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred 
schools of thought contend." E.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44-45.  When 
they responded with a blistering critique of the Communist Party, including its 
management of legal affairs, see, e.g., CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 165, at 
418, Mao abruptly cracked down on dissent. E.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, 
at 45.  For a more elaborate account of the "hundred flowers movement" and 
Mao's "anti-rightist" response, see MU FU-SHENG, THE WILTING OF THE HUNDRED 
FLOWERS: THE CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA UNDER MAO 166-73 (1962). 
 259. Notwithstanding their shifting fortunes under Mao, procuratorates in the 
PRC are similar to procurators' offices in civil law jurisdictions, which in turn 
are roughly comparable to attorneys' general or district attorneys' offices in 
common law jurisdictions. Compare, e.g., PRC CONST., supra note 5, arts. 129-35 
(1982) (describing the structure and functions of the procuracy), and Organic 
Law of the People's Procuratorates of the People's Republic of China (adopted by 
the Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 4 of the 
Chairman Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 
1980, as amended by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1983), 
art. 8, translated in ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST., LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/olotppotproc656/ 
(P.R.C.), and Yu-Nan Chang, The Chinese Communist State System Under the 
Constitution of 1954, 18 J. POL. 520, 544-45 (1956) (explaining the functions of 
procuratorates under the 1954 PRC Constitution and the Organic Law of the 
People's Procuratorates in effect at the time), with MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 57, at 104-05 (summarizing the functions and career paths 
of public prosecutors in civil law jurisdictions). 
 260. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 44-45; Keller, supra note 20, at 723. 
 261. See id. at 45. 
 262. See Keller, supra note 20, at 723. 
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lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution,263 when even the CPC 
newspaper People’s Daily editorialized in favor of lawlessness.264  
Throughout this turbulent period, the normative policy 
documents issued by the State’s administrative authorities 
functioned as a substitute for law per se.265  The intensity and 
duration of Mao’s onslaught made it impossible for socialist legal 
theory to put down the cultural roots in China that otherwise 
might have transformed it into an emergent Chinese legal 
tradition.266 
The modern era of Chinese legal history began in 1978, when 
at the behest of Deng Xiaoping the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CPC formally called for the 
strengthening of the PRC’s “socialist legal system.”267  This effort, 
spurred primarily by the Central Government’s interest in jump-
starting the PRC’s development by integrating its economy with 
the global economy,268 has produced a partially Westernized legal 
system.269  Proponents of this legal modernization effort at first 
resurrected Soviet legal theory and even draft Chinese legislation 
from the 1950s; however, since the early 1980s these proponents 
have developed a more sophisticated conception of China’s own 
legal history and the function of law in China today.270  Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, which as “theory” has been elevated by the CPC 
to a status equal to that of Marxism and Leninism, has eclipsed 
both Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the pole 
star of China’s modernization efforts, and has been the ideological 
 
 263. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 45; Leng, supra note 193, at 358-59. 
 264. See In Praise of Lawlessness, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 31, 1967, translated in 
U.S. CONSULATE GEN. H.K., SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND PRESS 13 (Feb. 14, 
1967). 
 265. Keller, supra note 20, at 724. 
 266. Cf. supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (defining "legal tradition," 
and explaining the relationship between a society's legal tradition, its legal 
culture, and its legal system). 
 267. CHOW, supra note 94, at 56-57. Cf. Deng Xiaoping, Emancipate the Mind, 
Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future (December 13, 
1978), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 151, 157-58 (1984) 
(arguing in a speech at the close of preparations for the Third Plenum that the 
PRC must strengthen its legal system in order "[t]o ensure people's democracy"). 
 268. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
 269. See CHOW, supra note 94, at 64-66. 
 270. Keller, supra note 20, at 727. 
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driving force behind its legal revival.271  As a practical matter, 
Deng Xiaoping Theory pays only lip service to socialism per se, 
and then only for its instrumental value as a means of enabling 
China to remain independent of foreign domination, especially 
given the PRC’s current economic circumstances.272  Deng’s often 
cited adaptation of the old Sichuan (Szechuan) saying about the 
unimportance of a cat’s color as long as the cat catches mice 
endures as one of the most revealing symbols of his pragmatism 
in that regard.273  Given the PRC’s insistence that its legal 
system is a socialist one, it might be tempting to characterize the 
evolution of that legal system since 1978 as evidence of the 
emergence of a distinctly Chinese socialist legal theory.274  The 
purely instrumental link between Deng Xiaoping Theory and 
socialism per se, however, strongly suggests that these 
developments merely signify a resurgence of the pragmatic 
instrumentalism that has been a hallmark of Chinese legal 
culture since the unification of China under the Qin, but which 
found its most persistent expression in the Confucian legal 
tradition that began to emerge a hundred years later during the 
reign of the Han emperor Wudi.275 
 
 271. Lo, supra note 244, at 474, 476; see also Chang, supra note 209, at 377-78, 
384-86. 
 272. See Chang, supra note 209, at 385-86. 
 273. Cf., e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 53, at 217 (citing Deng's remark in 
pointing out that it would be easy to overstate the importance of socialist 
ideology per se in China today). See generally Qin Hanxiong, Deng Xiaoping's 
Famous "Cat Theory" from Where?, XINHUA (Apr. 24, 2011), http://news 
.xinhuanet.com/2011-04/24/c_121341795.htm (explaining the origin of Deng's 
"cat theory"). 
 274. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 30 n.4, 36-37 (explaining the version of 
Marxist legal theory used by Chinese legal scholars in their efforts to adapt 
Marxism to Chinese conditions, and arguing in the late 1980s that the Soviet 
model of legal theory continues to exert a strong influence in the PRC). Cf. Lo, 
supra note 244, at 474-86 (explaining Deng Xiaoping's approach to law, and 
arguing that it set the stage for the development of a Chinese socialist theory of 
law). 
 275. See Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 40 n.44, 49. Cf. id. at 30, 37-50 
(arguing that legal reforms in the PRC have paid lip service to Marxist legal 
theory, but otherwise have been purely pragmatic, with legal instrumentalism 
as a means of promoting economic development playing a prominent role); but 
see Keller, supra note 20, at 754-55 (identifying an instrumentalism rooted in 
Soviet socialist legal theory as an emphasis of the dominant theme in the 
development of the formal sources of PRC law in the 1980s and 1990s).  Yu 
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Even to the extent that socialist legal theory per se provides 
part of the ideational foundation for the PRC’s current legal 
system, it merely reinforces one of the most central tenets of the 
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition.  Socialist legal 
theory flowered beginning in the late 1930s when Josef Stalin 
(1879-1953) rejected the orthodox Marxist view that law was 
merely a tool of capitalist exploitation made obsolete by the 
destruction of the bourgeois State.276  The principal architect of 
the new view was Stalin’s chief prosecutor, Andrei Ianuar’evich 
Vyshinskii (1883-1954).277  Marx had conceptualized law as a 
product of the dissolution of natural human communities and the 
formation of the State for the purpose of protecting the property 
and interests of the ruling class,278 first under feudalism and 
then under capitalism.  Accordingly, orthodox Soviet Marxists 
expected both law and the State to wither away with the success 
of the proletarian revolution and the abolition of private property 
 
Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 37 (noting that the adoption by Chinese scholars 
in the 1950s of a Soviet model of legal theory "illustrates the beginnings of the 
Chinese-style pragmatic approach in law.").  For the significance of the Qin 
Dynasty and Emperor Wudi in the development of Chinese legal culture, see 
supra notes 69-78, 83-88, 99-109 and accompanying text. 
 276. Compare J. V. Stalin, Report to the XVIII Party Congress, in SOVIET 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 343, 347-48 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1951) (arguing that Marxism permits the socialist State to perform certain 
functions performed by the bourgeois State, albeit in the service of the 
proletarian dictatorship), with E. B. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law 
and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 111 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1951) (expounding on the view of law that Stalin rejected, from the 
perspective of a leading proponent). See generally Lo, supra note 244, at 470-71 
(summarizing the impact of Stalin's view on the development of socialist legal 
theory). 
 277. See, e.g., W. E. Butler, Towards an Introduction to Russian Legal Theory, 
in RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY xi, xliii-xliv (Int'l Library of Essays in Law & Legal 
Theory Series, Legal Cultures No. 11, Tom D. Campbell ser. ed., W. E. Butler 
vol. ed., 1996). Cf. A. Y. Vyshinsky, The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of 
Soviet Socialist Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 303 (Hugh W. Babb trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1951) (laying down the Stalinist line regarding the nature 
and functions of law in Soviet society). 
 278. See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I (S. Rayazanskaya trans. & 
ed.), in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146, 186-87 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W. W. 
Norton 2d ed. 1978) (1964). 
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under socialism.279  Vyshinskii argued, however, following Stalin, 
that both the law and the state would wither away only after they 
had achieved their maximum strength, which they would do 
under socialism, when socialism finally gave way to 
communism.280  He went on to define law in purely instrumental 
terms.  According to Vyshinskii, 
[l]aw is the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will 
of the dominant class and established in legal order, as well as of 
customs and rules of community life confirmed by state 
authority, the application whereof is guaranteed by the coercive 
force of the state to the end of safeguarding, making secure and 
developing social relationships and arrangements advantageous 
and agreeable to the dominant class.281 
Accordingly, law’s essential purpose under socialism is 
merely to strengthen the socialist State.282  It was not until the 
1970s that Soviet legal scholars began to depart publicly from the 
conflation of law in general (jus) with the positive law (lex) on 
which Vyshinskii’s instrumental conception of law rests.283 
In their efforts to build a socialist legal system, Chinese legal 
theorists wholeheartedly embraced Vyshinskii’s conception of law 
as the instrument through which the State pursues the interests 
of the ruling class.284  In their view, the function of the law is 
merely to express the norms of current CPC policy.285  To the 
 
 279. See, e.g., Pashukanis, supra note 276, at 121-24. Cf. id. at 119-20 ("Only 
bourgeois-capitalist society creates all the conditions essential to the attainment 
of complete definiteness by the juridic element in social relationships."). 
 280. See Vyshinsky, supra note 277, at 336. Cf. id. at 328 (arguing that that 
law reaches its highest stage of development under socialism).  For Vyshinskii, 
proponents of the orthodox Marxist view were "provocateur[s]," "wrecker[s]," 
"Trotsky-Bukharin fascist agents," and "traitors." Id. at 303-04, 307, 313-16. 
 281. Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).  For alternative versions of Vyshinskii's 
definition, both as delivered orally and as subsequently published, see Butler, 
supra note 277, at xliii. 
 282. Cf. id. at 331-32 (arguing that "the tasks of the science of soviet socialist 
law . . . require . . . the development and strengthening of soviet law and the 
soviet state to the maximum degree.").  Vyshinskii insisted, however, that law 
was not merely synonymous with state policy. See id. at 328, 330. 
 283. Butler, supra note 277, at xliv. 
 284. Keller, supra note 20, at 720; Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 36-37. 
 285. Keller, supra note 20, at 721. 
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extent that there is any truth in the PRC’s insistence that its 
legal system is, or ever has been, a meaningfully socialist one, 
despite the ravages that it suffered under Mao and its partial 
Westernization since 1978, the purportedly socialist theoretical 
foundation of that system merely reinforces one of the most 
central tenets of the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal 
tradition, according to which law is merely a source of political 
power with no inherent moral significance.286  The idea that the 
positive law (lex), if not law in general (jus), is inherently 
instrumentalist, is such a core component of socialist legal theory 
that the same reinforcing relationship would hold true whether 
the socialist legal theory underpinning the PRC’s current legal 
system were the Stalinist version imported by the Chinese 
Communists in the 1950s but ultimately orphaned by Mao, or 
some post-1978, specifically Chinese variant developed to support 
the PRC’s more recent economic modernization efforts. 
Against this cultural and theoretical backdrop, the relative 
ineffectiveness of Western-style environmental laws in the PRC–
from both compliance and enforcement perspectives–should come 
as no surprise.  For more than 2,000 years, the Confucian essence 
of the Chinese legal tradition has marginalized law as a means of 
maintaining social and political order, and thus as a means of 
implementing public policies, which is one of its principal 
functions in the West.287  Socialist legal theory–to the extent that 
it plays any meaningful role as part of the ideational foundation 
of the PRC’s current legal system–reinforces this Confucian 
cultural phenomenon by positing law as a mere instrument of 
political power, rather than as an inherently moral force. 
The results of recent social science survey research on the 
perceived effectiveness of environmental law enforcement in the 
PRC implicitly underscore this point.  In 2000, researchers 
concerned about an environmental law “enforcement gap” in the 
 
 286. Cf. supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral 
validity in the Confucian legal tradition). 
 287. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 9 ("A government bound by law [in 
accordance with the Western rule of law concept] must act through pre-written 
laws in executing its decisions and change laws through established legislative 
means. . . . Binding the government to rule by law is the sine qua non of the rule 
of law."). 
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PRC surveyed local environmental enforcement officials in three 
cities, deemed to be broadly representative of urban China, in 
order to assess the relative influence of certain factors on the 
officials’ perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental law 
enforcement in their jurisdictions, and to identify any 
geographical variation in these patterns of influence.288  The 
researchers used the perceptions of these officials as reasonably 
reliable proxies for the effectiveness of environmental law 
enforcement per se,289 which they conceptualized in terms that 
seemed to presume noncompliance in the absence of 
enforcement.290  Of the five factors analyzed, the officials’ beliefs 
in the legitimacy of the policies expressed through environmental 
laws was the only one that had a significant positive relationship 
to the officials’ perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental 
law enforcement in all three cities, with relatively little variation 
across jurisdictions.291  This result led the researchers to conclude 
that environmental officials in the PRC should be hired and 
 
 288. See Carlos Wing-hung Lo, Gerald E. Fryxell & Wilson Wai-ho Wong, 
Effective Regulations with Little Effect? The Antecedents of the Perceptions of 
Environmental Officials on Enforcement Effectiveness in China, 38 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 388, 389-90, 394 (2006) [hereinafter Lo et al.].  The officials questioned 
were officials of the local EPBs. Id. at 394.  For a summary of the role of local 
EPBs in the PRC's environmental law and policy regime, see supra notes 53-54 
and accompanying text. 
 289. See Lo et al., supra note 288, at 390, 395. 
 290. Cf. id. at 390, 391 (defining "enforcement effectiveness" in terms of 
"closing the enforcement gap" by "securing compliance," and defining 
"enforcement gap" as a gap in compliance, not in enforcement).  This apparent 
presumption is significant in the Chinese context given the Confucian 
conception of law as inherently lacking in moral force. Cf. supra note 100 and 
accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral validity in the Confucian legal 
tradition). 
 291. See Lo et al., supra note 288, at 399, 402-03.  The researchers had 
hypothesized that the relationship between these variables would be positive, 
and that there would be a positive relationship between the enforcement 
officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of environmental law enforcement in 
their jurisdictions and the officials' environmental values, perceptions of 
sufficient organizational capacity, perceptions of support from other societal 
organizations, and perceptions of support from local and regional governmental 
departments, and that the relationships between these factors and the officials' 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the policies expressed through environmental 
laws, on the one hand, and the officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of 
environmental law enforcement in their jurisdictions, on the other hand, would 
vary by location. See id. at 391-94. 
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trained so as to ensure that they believe in the legitimacy of their 
work.292  It also implies, however, that the extent to which 
enforcement officials consider the policies expressed through the 
PRC’s environmental laws to be legitimate is more important 
than the fact that those policies are expressed through law per se 
in determining the extent to which they are likely to be enforced.  
This effect is precisely what one would expect in a society steeped 
for millennia in an essentially Confucian legal tradition, in which 
law per se has no inherent moral significance.293 
IV.  TOWARD A CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY REGIME WITH MORE CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The Chinese people have every reason to be proud of their 
ancient civilization.294  Even Mao Zedong, whose goal in founding 
the PRC was not merely to create a free and prosperous China, 
but “to change a China which has been ignorant and backward 
under the rule of the old culture into a China that will be 
enlightened and progressive under the rule of a new culture,” 
acknowledged China’s ancient cultural splendor, and argued that 
the success of his transformational project depended on the 
absorption into the new culture of certain features of the old.295  
Yet for more than a century, in a radical departure from 
millennia of past practice,296 China has looked to the West for 
 
 292. See id. at 402-04. 
 293. Cf. supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining fa's lack of moral 
validity in the Confucian legal tradition). 
 294. Cf. PRC CONST., supra note 5, pmbl., para. 1 (1982) ("China is one of the 
countries with the longest histories in the world. The people of all nationalities 
in China have jointly created a splendid culture . . . ."). 
 295. MAO TSE-TUNG ON NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 181, at 3, 81-82. 
 296. Cf. CONFUCIUS, supra note 80, at bk. VII, ¶ 1 (quoting Confucius as 
saying, "I transmit but do not innovate; I am . . . devoted to antiquity."); Chiang 
Kai-shek, Conclusion to SUN YAT-SEN, SAN MIN CHU I: THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF 
THE PEOPLE WITH TWO SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS BY CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 318, 324-
29 (Frank W. Price trans., Comm'n for the Compilation of the History of the 
Kuomintang ed., n.d.) (describing in detail how the goal of Sun Yat-sen's plans 
for a Min Sheng ("People's Livelihood") type of social reconstruction resembles 
the ancient Confucian vision of a "Great Commonwealth"); SUN YAT-SEN, supra 
note 118, at 37-41, 151, 184 (arguing that the Chinese people must recover their 
ancient morality if they are to restore their international standing, and equating 
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models of its own future, with mixed results.297  In recent 
decades, the Chinese have made no secret of their eagerness to 
borrow from Western environmental laws.298  The result 
illustrates the pitfalls of a derivative approach.299 
One strategy for improving the effectiveness of the PRC’s 
environmental law and policy regime would be to transform the 
PRC’s legal culture along Western lines so as to make it more 
supportive of the PRC’s nominally Chinese but heavily law-based, 
essentially Western approach to mitigating the negative 
environmental impacts of China’s rapid industrialization.  The 
barriers to the success of this strategy would be formidable, 
however.  As cultural phenomena, legal traditions are enduring 
by definition.300  Cultures “resist manipulation,” as one social 
scientist has observed, because “people defend their 
assumptions,”301 and pass them on to the next generation of their 
social group as constitutive elements of the group’s identity.302  
Transforming the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal 
tradition, which continues to roll through the millennia like a 
juggernaut despite more than a century of fitful efforts to 
 
the goal of his Min Sheng ("People's Livelihood") Principle with Confucius's hope 
of a "great commonwealth."). 
 297. See FAIRBANK, REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 110, at 315-20; KENT, 
supra note 113, at 26-29, 34, 64-65, 168-69, 360, 374-75; PEERENBOOM, supra 
note 53, at 43; REINSCH, supra note 115, at 42, 231; SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 
218-19; SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 46, 108-09, 136; Keller, supra note 20, 
at 712. 
 298. See Standaert 07/20/11, supra note 22. Cf. Standaert 01/18/12, supra note 
47 (describing the PRC's use of foreign models in its efforts to design pilot 
carbon trading systems for several provinces and municipalities). 
 299. Cf. SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 343, 355-57 (arguing that China's efforts 
to adapt to the outside world by imitating the West leaves "China's individual 
genius . . . thwarted of its own expression," as illustrated by Sun Yat-sen's 
disregard for the fundamentally family-based structure of Chinese society in his 
plan for a Chinese republic.). 
 300. Cf. Gerring & Barresi, supra note 58, at 252 (identifying endurance as an 
ideal-type attribute of the culture concept as revealed by the ordinary social 
science usage of the term). 
 301. SAMUEL H. BARNES, POLITICS AND CULTURE 16 (1988). 
 302. Cf. Gerring & Barresi, supra note 58, at 249, 255 (identifying culture's 
"learned" and constitutive qualities as ideal-type and minimal attributes of the 
culture concept, respectively, as revealed by the ordinary social science usage of 
the term). 
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Westernize China’s legal institutions,303 would be especially 
fraught with challenges.  It would be the work of generations, 
perhaps dozens of generations,304 if it could be done at all, as 
Mao’s ghost might attest.305  Given the severity and 
pervasiveness of the PRC’s environmental crisis,306 as well as the 
PRC’s newfound status as the world’s largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide,307 the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas,308 
neither China nor the world has the time to wait. 
A more viable strategy would seek to make the PRC’s 
environmental law and policy regime more effective by aligning it 
more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal 
tradition.309  At least three strategic corrections to the current 
trajectory of that regime would seem to be in order.  First, the 
PRC’s environmental law and policy regime probably would be 
more effective if it relied on law as little as possible as a means of 
expressing environmental policies, which probably means relying 
on it much less than is the case now.  Law is merely one way of 
expressing public policies.310  Political practice is another.311  It 
 
 303. See Keller, supra note 20, at 714 (“There is little overt evidence of a direct 
link between China's imperial legal order and the one more recently established 
under the People's Republic of China," except for a few conceptual and 
organizational terms embedded in PRC legislation, but arguing that "the 
influence of China's once dominant Confucian ethos is readily apparent in the 
variant strains of modern Chinese legal culture."). 
 304. Cf. SHARMAN, supra note 152, at 370-71 (arguing that the creation of an 
ethic of democracy in China would be a multi-generational task). 
 305. Cf. supra notes 181, 187-201, 211-17 and accompanying text (describing 
Mao's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to rid Chinese culture of Confucianism, 
and its resurgence even at an official level in recent years). 
 306. Cf. supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing the PRC's 
environmental crisis). 
 307. See Press Release, PBL Neth. Envtl. Assessment Agency, Chinese CO2 
Emissions in Perspective (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.pbl.nl/en/ 
news/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emissionsinperspective.html. 
 308. Cf. WEART, supra note 16, at 2, 26-30, 114, 126-29 (comparing the current 
and potential future contributions to global warming of anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide and other anthropogenic greenhouse gases). 
 309. Cf. Yu Xingzhong, supra note 107, at 34 (noting that as a legal adviser to 
the Guomindang Ministry of Justice in the twilight of the Republic Roscoe 
Pound argued that the Chinese should seek Chinese solutions to Chinese 
problems instead of adopting Western legal principles). 
 310. See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 130-31 (1953). 
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has become clear that the PRC’s national five-year plans–as well 
as the larger complex of related shorter- and longer-term national 
and local planning and related policy documents of which those 
five-year plans are a part–can be much more effective than law in 
achieving ambitious environmental policy goals.312  Although the 
national five-year plans are ratified by the NPC,313 they are 
essentially political documents drafted by Central Government 
bureaucrats under the supervision of the CPC to provide a “vision 
and guideline” (guihua) for economic and social development 
practice at all administrative levels of the State, and increasingly 
include a host of environmental policy goals.314  Law undoubtedly 
has an important role to play in the PRC’s future efforts to 
mitigate the negative environmental impacts of its rapid 
industrialization, but the Confucian attitudes toward the role of 
law in society and the polity around which the Chinese legal 
tradition has revolved for more than 2,000 years strongly suggest 
that environmental law would be more effective in the PRC if 
 
 311. See id. at 131. 
 312. Cf. Michael Standaert, Energy: Chinese Provinces Restrict Electricity Use, 
Raise Rates to Meet Energy Intensity Goals, 33 INT'L ENV'T REP. 941 (2010) 
(describing the extraordinary efforts of many provinces to meet the energy 
intensity goals in the PRC's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-10) in the final 
months of the planning period). See generally JOSEPH CASEY & KATHERINE 
KOLESKI, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC & SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 
BACKGROUNDER: CHINA'S 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 2, 5-7  (2011), available at http:// 
origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf 
(describing the powerful political incentives for local government officials to 
achieve the goals of the national five-year plans, noting the use of additional 
incentives for local officials to achieve the environmental and energy policy goals 
in those plans, and noting elements of the complex of government planning and 
related policy documents of which the plans are a part). 
 313. See PRC CONST., supra note 5, art. 62(9) (1982). 
 314. See, e.g., CASEY & KOLESKI, supra note 312, at 1-3, 11, app. I, app. II at 
16-17, apps. III-IV.  Since the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-10), the Chinese 
authorities have used the term guihua (kueihua) -- literally "plan" or "planning," 
but connoting "vision and guideline," "program," or "layout" -- instead of the 
term jihua (chihua) -- merely "plan" or "planning" -- to refer to these documents, 
which signifies a shift in focus from detailed central planning and quantitative 
economic indicators to a more market-oriented approach, broad principles and 
development goals, and a range of quality of life factors, including 
environmental ones.  See C. Cindy Fan, China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010): From "Getting Rich First" to "Common Prosperity," 47 EURASIAN 
GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 708, 717-18 (2006). 
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there were much less of it than is the norm in the West, which 
probably means much less of it than there is now. 
Second, the PRC’s environmental law and policy regime 
probably would be more effective if its laws focused more than 
they do now on policing the behavior of state bureaucrats, and 
less on regulating the activities of private parties and their quasi-
private analogs, such as state-owned enterprises.  In their 
heightened concern for punishing state bureaucrats for purely 
administrative transgressions, the PRC’s environmental laws 
already focus disproportionately on policing official behavior by 
Western standards.315  Moreover, except for the provisions that 
create or elaborate on private judicial or administrative causes of 
action for injunctive relief or to recover compensatory damages 
for environmental injuries,316 the PRC’s environmental statutes 
at least superficially appear to follow the traditional Chinese 
pattern in that the private or quasi-private activities with which 
they are concerned are limited to those that impinge on state 
interests–in this case, the State’s interests in achieving or 
maintaining a desired level of environmental quality and in 
preserving the social stability that presumably flows from doing 
so.317  Just beneath the surface of these statutes, however, lies a 
welter of Western-style policy design principles and 
implementation strategies.318  The effect is to enmesh private 
parties and their quasi-private analogs in an intricate, Western-
style web of substantive and procedural requirements that in the 
context of Western legal traditions–in which law is an inherently 
moral force that plays a principal role in maintaining social and 
 
 315. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions 
of the PRC's environmental statutes and Administrative Punishments Law 
aimed at punishing state bureaucrats for purely administrative transgressions). 
 316. See, e.g., PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, arts. 85-86; PRC Solid 
Waste Law, supra note 30, art. 84; PRC Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 
28, art. 62; PRC Noise Pollution Law, supra note 31, art. 61. Cf. PRC Marine 
Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 90, para. 1 (requiring anyone causing 
pollution damage to the marine environment to remove the pollution and 
provide compensation for the losses). 
 317. Cf. supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing the PRC's 
environmental crisis, including its socially destabilizing effects). 
 318. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the 
Western-style policy design principles and implementation strategies around 
which the PRC's environmental laws revolve). 
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political order319–would be merely one of the many legal costs of 
doing business in a modern society, but in the context of the 
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition is a prescription 
for noncompliance.320  The PRC’s environmental law and policy 
regime probably would be more effective if its laws applied to 
private parties and their quasi-private analogs only indirectly 
through the agency of state bureaucrats to the maximum extent 
possible given the laws’ policy goals, which probably means to a 
much greater extent than is the case now.  In accordance with 
millennia of Chinese practice inspired by the Confucian essence 
of the Chinese legal tradition, the PRC’s environmental laws 
would look primarily to the bureaucracy as the human 
instrumentality for achieving their goals.321 
Third, the PRC’s environmental law and policy regime 
probably would be more effective if its laws could be applied more 
flexibly in ways designed to accommodate–or even to reinforce–
certain types of locally valued social relationships in which the 
private and quasi-private enterprises to which those laws apply 
are embedded.  One of the hallmarks of Western environmental 
laws is the nearly universal equality with which their 
requirements are applied.  Western environmental statutes and 
regulations can be unequal in their formulation, especially where 
structurally fragmented law- and policy-making systems–like 
that of the United States–offer numerous points of access for 
organized interests seeking to influence law and policy 
outcomes.322  The result is often a host of statutory or regulatory 
 
 319. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 5-6, 8-9, 10-11 (emphasizing that 
"[p]rotection from one's fellow citizens – or law and order, as we would say today 
– . . . is central to the popular understanding of the rule of law," an historically 
Western cultural and institutional phenomenon, and explaining the history and 
implications of the concept of a State bound by law as a rule of law goal); 
REISCHAUER & FAIRBANK, supra note 77, at 84 ("Western law has been conceived 
of as a human embodiment of some higher order of God or nature . . . ."). 
 320. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (emphasizing that law per 
se almost never has played more than a subordinate role in maintaining social 
and political order in China). 
 321. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (explaining the imperial 
fa's preoccupation with policing the behavior of state bureaucrats). 
 322. See generally KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED 
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 289-357 (1986) (exploring the many ways 
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exclusions or other special legal considerations for politically 
skillful economic interests,323 and on rare occasions for individual 
facilities.324  Moreover, in Western federations and 
confederations, national environmental laws also may give 
regional governments substantial discretion either in setting 
environmental quality standards or in choosing the best means to 
achieve them, which may include treating different subregions 
differently, including on economic grounds, but typically within 
legal limits set at the national level.325  Yet despite these 
structurally conditioned anomalies, Western environmental laws 
generally impose the same substantive and procedural 
requirements on all regulated parties that fall within broadly 
 
in which organized interests try to influence policy-making in the legislative and 
executive branches of the U.S. Federal Government). 
 323. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (excluding from the statutory 
definition of "hazardous substance" petroleum and certain petroleum products, 
natural gas in gaseous or liquid form, and synthetic gas that can be used for 
fuel); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(b)(2)-(5), (b)(7) (2012) (excluding from the statutory 
definition of "hazardous waste" in regulations implementing the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act certain agricultural; mining; coal and other 
fossil fuel combustion; crude oil, natural gas, and geothermal energy 
exploration, development, or production; and ore and mineral extraction, 
beneficiation, and processing wastes). 
 324. Cf. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.43(a)(2), (e) (2011) (permitting a particular fossil-fuel-
fired steam generating facility in the State of Illinois to comply with an 
alternative to the performance standard for sulfur dioxide applicable to other 
fossil-fuel-fired steam generating facilities under the Clean Air Act). 
 325. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) 
(2006) (requiring States to review periodically and to revise as appropriate–or at 
the States' discretion to adopt as new–state ambient water quality standards in 
accordance with the uses for which the States have designated the relevant 
waters, and within certain federally imposed constraints); Clean Air Act §§ 
107(d)-(e), 161-63, 164(a)-(b), 166, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)-(e), 7471-73, 7474(a)-(b), 
7476 (2006) (authorizing States to designate or to redesignate certain air quality 
control regions so as to permit new emissions of certain pollutants to different 
degrees within different regions under the statutory provisions requiring the 
prevention of significant deterioration of air quality within such regions, within 
certainly federally imposed constraints); Council Directive 2000/60, Framework 
for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, arts. 4(5), 5(1), 2000 O.J. (L 
327) 1, 14-16 (EC) (as amended) (authorizing Member States to pursue 
environmental objectives less stringent than otherwise would be required for 
specific bodies of water when they are so heavily affected by human activity, as 
determined by the Member States, or their natural condition is such that 
achieving the objectives that otherwise would be required would be infeasible or 
disproportionately expensive, under certain Community-imposed conditions). 
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defined categories distinguished by the inherent attributes of 
their members.  The U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
for example, requires nearly all point source discharges of certain 
pollutants to certain waters to comply with performance 
standards based on the “best available technology economically 
achievable” for the relevant point source category.326  The 
regulations implementing the statute generally express these 
performance standards in terms of numerical concentrations that 
apply uniformly to discharges from all point sources in discrete 
industrial sectors, such as steam electric power generators, with 
some variation depending on the size of the facility.327  Similarly, 
the European Community’s Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation 
generally requires any manufacturer or importer of a chemical 
substance in quantities of one ton or more per year to register 
that substance with the European Chemicals Agency.328  The 
nearly universal equality with which substantive and procedural 
requirements such as these are applied in the West is an 
institutional expression of the principle of equality before the law, 
which is an integral part of all Western legal traditions.329 
Notwithstanding the PRC’s embrace of a host of Western-
style policy design principles and implementation strategies as 
mainstays of its environmental laws, 330 the principle of equality 
before the law of which the nearly universal applicability of these 
strategies in the West is an expression, and on which their 
effectiveness depends, is foreign to the Chinese legal tradition.331  
 
 326. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 301(b)(2)(A)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Cf. id. §§ 502(12), (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12), (14) 
(defining "discharge of a pollutant" and "point source"). 
 327. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.13(a)-(b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e), (g) (2012). 
 328. See Council Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), arts. 3(1)-(2), (9), (11), 
(18), 6(1), 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1, 53-54, 55, 57, 62 (EC). 
 329. Cf. BELTON, supra note 243, at 9-10 (explaining the principle of equality 
before the law as an essential element of the Western rule of law concept). 
 330. Cf. supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the 
Western-style policy design principles and implementation strategies around 
which the PRC's environmental laws revolve). 
 331. Cf., e.g., BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 21, 29 (attributing the 
Confucian antipathy to law in part to its obliteration of Confucian social 
relationships through the imposition of uniform behavioral norms, and 
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In accordance with the Confucian essence of that tradition, which 
rests in part on the Mencian conception of society as naturally 
and harmoniously stratified,332 Chinese law always has been 
applied unequally in ways that reflect prevailing social norms.333  
The imperial fa, for example, treated different persons 
differently–whether they were defendants, would-be defendants, 
or convicted persons–depending on their status within the 
Confucian social hierarchy, both in the abstract and relative to 
any injured parties.334  Mao and his cadres substituted class 
status for Confucian social rank as the relevant legal touchstone, 
but retained the Confucian principle of inequality before the law 
as a central feature of the PRC’s rudimentary socialist legal 
system.335  Deng Xiaoping professed to make equality before the 
law one of the central goals of the legal reforms that he 
championed after Mao’s death.336  His emphasis was on 
eliminating the extralegal political and economic privileges 
enjoyed by certain CPC cadres by virtue of their party status, 
however, which he blamed for causing great suffering among the 
masses during the Cultural Revolution and for wounding the 
CPC’s prestige, not on embracing the Western cultural conception 
of equality before the law per se.337  More importantly, the belief 
that the application of the positive law should be tempered by 
 
emphasizing that the most basic distinction between the Legalist fa and the 
Confucian li is the universalism of the former and the social and circumstantial 
particularism of the latter). 
 332. Cf. supra note 81-82 and accompanying text (introducing Mencius and 
summarizing his most important contributions to Confucianism). 
 333. These norms seem to have been as enduring as Confucianism itself, 
despite the professed desires of would-be Westernizers to nibble around their 
edges.  Cf., e.g., SUN YAT-SEN, supra note 118, at 78-82 (arguing that there is no 
such thing as natural human equality, but that an artificial equality in political 
status could be and should be created). 
 334. Supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 335. See Leng, supra note 193, at 363-65; Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, supra note 
244, at 473, 473-74 n.14. 
 336. See, e.g., Carlos W. H. Lo, Deng Xiaoping's Ideas on Law: China on the 
Threshold of a Legal Order, 32 ASIAN SURV. 649, 653-54, 656 (1992). 
 337. See Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State 
Leadership (August 18, 1980), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-
1982) 302, 309, 315-16 (Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party 
of China, 1984). 
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extralegal factors such as the relationship and circumstances of 
the parties and widely shared conceptions of justice remains 
nearly as widespread in the PRC as it was in the Empire.338 
This enduring Chinese cultural preference for flexible legal 
norms that vary in accordance with the social relationships and 
circumstances of the parties and reflect widely shared social 
norms could be used to strengthen the PRC’s environmental law 
and policy regime.339  The most basic conflict of relevance to the 
relative ineffectiveness of environmental law in the PRC is the 
conflict perceived to exist between short-term economic 
development imperatives and longer term environmental quality 
goals.340  Although the political pressures fueling this conflict 
come from both the highest and lowest reaches of governance in 
the PRC, its geographical locus is primarily local.341  One way of 
using law to reconcile this conflict in a manner consistent with 
the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition would be to 
make the PRC’s environmental laws more pervasively but 
precisely flexible in ways designed to accommodate–or even to 
reinforce–economically relevant social relationships that are 
valued throughout the local community.  For example, the PRC’s 
air and water pollution control statutes currently authorize 
certain local governments to establish their own local 
performance standards for sources of air and water pollution, but 
only when those standards would be supplementary to or more 
stringent than the national standards established by the Central 
Government.342  These statutes probably would be viewed as 
 
 338. See Keller, supra note 20, at 715. 
 339. But cf. id. at 751 (arguing that the social context in which the laws are 
applied is not likely to be as useful in stabilizing legal practice in China as it 
once was because economic development and exposure to foreign influences have 
undermined the homogeneity of Chinese society). 
 340. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.  The sustainable 
development concept is essentially an effort to demonstrate that this conflict is 
more perceived than real. Cf. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON 
FUTURE 43-46 (1987) (defining and elaborating on the sustainable development 
concept). 
 341. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
 342. See PRC Water Pollution Law, supra note 29, art. 13, paras. 1-2; PRC 
Atmospheric Pollution Law, supra note 28, art. 7, paras. 1-2. Cf. PRC Marine 
Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 32, art. 10 (referring to "national and local water 
pollutant discharge standards"). See generally PRC Envtl. Prot. Law, supra note 
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more legitimate locally–and thus probably would be more 
effective nationwide–if they authorized local governments to relax 
the national performance standards with respect to industrial 
enterprises that play an especially important role in the local 
economy, especially by providing large numbers of local people 
with a decent living under decent working conditions, while 
imposing more stringent standards on other enterprises, such as 
those that employ mostly migrant workers from elsewhere in 
China,343 albeit within the aggregate constraints implied by the 
applicable ambient environmental quality standards.  This 
arrangement would sacrifice the equality before the law that 
Western legal traditions prize so highly, but which is foreign to 
the Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition, in order to 
accommodate, if not to reinforce, certain widely valued local social 
relationships that, if ignored, can undermine the local 
effectiveness of environmental laws through both widespread 
noncompliance and spotty enforcement.344 
These preliminary suggestions for strategic corrections to the 
current trajectory of the PRC’s environmental law and policy 
regime hardly exhaust the possibilities.  Yet each of them, if 
implemented, would be an important step toward aligning that 
regime more closely with the Confucian essence of the Chinese 
legal tradition.  Much like the negative yin and the positive yang, 
China’s legal institutions and its legal culture must be 
complementary if they are to function harmoniously as the two 
halves of a coherent whole.345  The nominally Chinese but heavily 
 
21, art. 10, (authorizing certain local governments to establish "local standards 
for the discharge of pollutants" that supplement or are more stringent than the 
national standards established by the Central Government). 
 343. See generally Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Factories Now Compete to Woo 
Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/ 
13/world/asia/13factory.html (exploring the complexities of the migrant factory 
labor market in the PRC). 
 344. Cf. supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (explaining how local 
economic development imperatives impair the effectiveness of the PRC's 
environmental laws). 
 345. According to one of the ancient Chinese cosmologies on which imperial 
Confucianism is based, the negative yin and the positive yang are the two 
complementary forces that control the universe. See, e.g., SMITH & WENG, supra 
note 85, at 79-80.  For a summary of the origin and content of imperial 
Confucianism, see supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
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law-based, essentially Western approach to mitigating the 
negative environmental impacts of industrialization that the PRC 
has pursued in recent decades, on the one hand, and the ancient 
Confucian essence of the Chinese legal tradition, on the other, 
hardly could be less complementary.  By transforming the former 
so as to align it with the latter, the PRC could harmonize its 
efforts to solve its environmental crisis, which would make those 
efforts much more effective.  Given the depth and breadth of that 
crisis, as well as the PRC’s growing contribution to the 
exacerbation of global environmental challenges such as 
anthropogenic climate change, neither China nor the world has 
any time to lose. 
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